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PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Jamal Greene
Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades
by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle’s
classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which
appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument,
which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument
is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse—
think of “Poor Joshua!”— but existing accounts of constitutional
practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of
and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial
opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is
one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional
argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its
best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of
discourses—text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences—
that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics.
Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in
opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate
writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional
argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when
they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions.
A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in
constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means
to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
Much successful constitutional argument is, in a classical sense,
pathetic. A pathetic argument is one that appeals to pathos, or emotion.
Persuasion may result, Aristotle wrote, “[W]hen [the hearers] are led to
feel emotion by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when
grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile.”1 Pathos is one of
several modes of persuasion in law, as in other practical discourse, and
may be especially so in constitutional law, whose successful elaboration
must align with our deepest commitments. A commitment whose
evocation fails to stir emotion among the committed is unlikely to have
been very deep.

1. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse bk. 1, ch. 2, § 5 (George A.
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (n.d.) (alteration omitted).
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And yet one detects an unexamined ambivalence toward the
appropriate role of emotion in constitutional discourse. Taxonomists of
constitutional argument, even those whose project is descriptive, typically
ignore or dismiss emotional appeal as a standard mode of persuasion in
constitutional law. Philip Bobbitt, for example, devotes less than one
sentence in his Constitutional Fate to “pathetic” argument, writing that it
“has to do with the idiosyncratic, personal traits and thus reflects one
feature of illegitimate judicial opinions which is often confounded with
[ethical argument].”2 Bobbitt’s concern appears to be that invoking pathos
in a constitutional case requires the judge to individuate decisionmaking
that should properly be general. The same basic concern animated
objections to President Obama’s invocation of “empathy” and
“compassion” as desirable traits in a Supreme Court Justice.3 As the
majority opinion stated in Roe v. Wade, “Our task, of course, is to resolve
the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection.”4
The author of that opinion, Justice Blackmun, would later write,
dissenting in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
that “compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.”5 That
statement appears just before what has become the canonical example of
pathos in a judicial opinion. The DeShaney Court held that a state agency
that failed to adequately investigate reports of child abuse could not be
held liable under the Due Process Clause for resulting injuries to the child,
Joshua DeShaney. Justice Blackmun began his final paragraph thus:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, “dutifully
recorded these incidents in [their] files.” It is a sad commentary
upon American life, and constitutional principles—so full of late
of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and
justice for all”—that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned
to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.6

2. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 95 (1982) [hereinafter
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate].
3. See infra text accompanying notes 89–100 (presenting President Obama’s
statements that judges’ empathy and experiences assist in justice and criticism of those
statements).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (emphasis added); see Terry A. Maroney, The
Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 629, 633 (2011) (“[J]udicial
dispassion has come to be regarded as a core requirement of the rule of law . . . .”).
5. 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Anger, sadness, guilt, and shame are all in play in Justice Blackmun’s
opinion, drafted in his own hand.7 The individuation of Joshua DeShaney,
the appeal drawn from his idiosyncratic, personal traits, is deliberate and
effective.
Which Justice Blackmun—the one in Roe or the one in DeShaney—was
true to the practice of constitutional law? Which Justice Blackmun was
true to its aspirations? These questions form this Article’s subject.
There is an insightful but surprisingly small literature on the related
but quite distinct question of the role of emotion in judicial
decisionmaking.8 Legal realists such as Jerome Frank and Arthur Corbin
wrote of what they believed to be the inevitable influence of emotion as a
constitutive element of a judge’s personhood, and therefore of the
decisions he reached.9 More recently, Richard Posner has argued that
emotion invariably contributes to decisionmaking under uncertainty, for
judges as for others.10 Martha Nussbaum and Terry Maroney, among
others, have emphasized the compatibility between emotion and
substantive rationality; on these accounts, what Maroney calls the
“cultural script of judicial dispassion” does affirmative damage to the legal
decisional process.11
These discussions have focused predominantly on the judge as an
object of emotional argument, the pathetic appellee as it were. Still less has
been written of the distinct role of a judge as a producer rather than a
recipient of emotional appeals. Law and literature scholars have
approached law as a form of rhetoric, but have not much integrated their
7. See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s Supreme
Court Journey 230–31 (2005) (including reproduction of Blackmun’s draft).
8. A helpful summary of this scholarship appears in Maroney, supra note 4, at 652–64.
9. See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 119 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930)
(“The peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits of the particular judge will . . . often
determine what he decides to be the law.”); Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale
Rev. 234, 250 (1914) (“Law is not logic, nor does reason play the chief part in its creation. It
grows in the semi-darkness of ignorance and emotion, it is based upon racial experience,
and it represents the custom and the interest and the desire of the average man.”); see also
Theodore Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 89, 96
(1918) (describing judicial decisions as “revelation of the emotions, the phantasies, the
desires, the persistent past life and the present intellectual status of the judge”).
10. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 105–10 (2008) [hereinafter Posner,
Think].
11. Maroney, supra note 4, at 633 (calling idea of judicial dispassion
“counterproductive” because it “undervalues what judicial emotion might bring to the table
and enfeebles our ability deliberately to channel emotion in service of good judging”); see
also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 269, 273–78 (1996) (defending “evaluative conception” of role of emotion in
criminal law jurisprudence, which posits “emotions express cognitive appraisals” that can be
both “morally evaluated” and improved through “moral education”). See generally Martha C.
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001) [hereinafter
Nussbaum, Upheavals] (elaborating view of emotions as cognitive appraisals connecting
one’s external environment to one’s significant commitments).
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accounts with those offered within more mainstream constitutional
scholarship.12 Criminal law scholars have written of the special place of
emotional appeals in assessing criminal culpability and calibrating
punishment.13 To the degree most legal academics have considered the
role emotional appeals play or should play in constitutional argument,
they have largely assimilated their analysis to an assessment of the role of
emotion in judicial decisionmaking, or else simply assumed that such
appeals fall self-evidently outside the judicial role.
Taking pathetic argument in constitutional law as a sui generis
subject, this Article challenges those assumptions both descriptively and
normatively. If anything is self-evident, it is that appeals to pathos are an
important element of constitutional practice. Yet the dominant typologies
of constitutional argument do not provide resources for understanding or
legitimating those appeals. Our ability to identify features of argument that
are special to constitutional law is said to constrain and, therefore, to
define constitutional law as a distinctive form of politics.14 Bobbitt
famously described six archetypes of constitutional argument: historical,
textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.15 But to cite just one
clear example of pathetic argument, Justice Kennedy, dissenting in
Stenberg v. Carhart, matter-of-factly describes a so-called partial birth
abortion by saying, “The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or
child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb.”16 Justice
Kennedy’s gruesome description of the procedure, designed deliberately
12. See generally James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics
of the Law (1985) [hereinafter White, Heracles’ Bow] (developing conception of law as
rhetorical process); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J.L. &
Human. 201 (1990) (applying insights from literary criticism to appellate judicial opinions).
13. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 361, 390–412 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy] (applying normative theory
of emotional appeals in law to use of victim impact statements); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra
note 11, at 305 (arguing “quality of . . . offenders’ emotion is one consideration that matters
in substantive criminal law”); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital
Emotions, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 355, 356–61 (2008), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/17/LRColl2008n17Berman
&Bibas.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (seeking to recover space for overt
appeals to emotion in capital context).
14. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing United States’
unique “legal grammar” and its role in constitutional interpretation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189,
1194 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist Coherence] (finding five main categories of
argument and authority in constitutional debate); cf. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 1325, 1333 (1984) (“The person who looks about and sees . . . a field already organized
by problems, impending decisions, . . . etc. is not free to choose or originate his own
meanings, because a set of meanings has . . . already chosen him and is working itself out in
the actions . . . he is even now performing.”).
15. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 3–119; Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation 12–13 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Constitutional
Interpretation] (listing modalities of constitutional argument).
16. 530 U.S. 914, 958–59 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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to disgust and to shame the audience, masquerades as a cold recitation of
facts but is integral to the opinion’s rhetorical mission.
It is difficult to fit this practice neatly into what Bobbitt calls the
“modalities” of constitutional argument.17 It is prudential in the sense that
it means to alert the reader to the social and moral consequences of
invalidating the state’s ban on the procedure. But much constitutional
argument, including argument squarely identified with other modalities, is
prudential if by the label we mean only that it contemplates consequences
for our social and moral life. Justice Kennedy’s tactics in Stenberg
constitute ethical argument in the sense that Kennedy’s grounds for
persuasion are rooted in a communal morality; he is advancing what
Richard Fallon would call a “value” argument.18 But Bobbitt does not mean
to conflate ethical argument with moral argument; ethical argument in his
usage rather harkens to the classical identification of ethos as a rhetorical
mode grounded in the character of the speaker, here the character of the
American people as embodied in their constitutional arrangements.19
The best way to understand the function of Justice Kennedy’s pathetic
appeal is not as an archetype of argument in itself, analogous to historical,
textual, and so on, but rather as a mode of persuasion. Pathetic argument
in constitutional law attends to and manipulates the reader’s emotions in
order to persuade her either as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome or as
to the substance or valence of established “modalities.” The key, then, to
understanding the role of pathetic argument in constitutional law lies in
distinguishing subjects of argument from forms of rhetoric. What makes
constitutional law special is that its theater of argument is confined largely
to text, structure, history, doctrine, and consequences. What makes
constitutional argument continuous with other forms of practical
discourse is that it employs the same basic tools of persuasion with
respect to those subjects: logos (appeals to logic), ethos (appeals to the
speaker’s character), and pathos (appeals to the listener’s emotions).
Identifying the persistent role of pathos (or indeed ethos and logos) in
constitutional argument does not by itself answer the normative question.
There are several reasons to believe, however, that pathetic argument is at
least sometimes an appropriate mode of persuasion in constitutional law.
First, whether or not pathetic argument can be eliminated from
constitutional law, it is in fact an established part of constitutional practice.
Constitutional law depends on a substantial measure of popular
acceptance for its legitimacy, and we have come to identify at least some
arguments in the pathetic mode as an accepted constitutional form.
Second, and significantly, constitutional adjudication at the appellate level
17. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 12.
18. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1205 (“[V]alue arguments assert
claims about what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, as measured against some
standard that is independent of what the constitutional text requires.”).
19. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 94.
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approaches a form of lawmaking in hard cases. It eschews error-correction
and self-consciously seeks to establish rules and standards of prospective
and general application.20 Lawmaking is not merely conventionally
understood as tolerating emotional appeals; rather, pathetic argument is
essential to lawmaking because emotion is integral to public morality.
Popular legitimation of constitutional adjudication requires judges to
recognize, adapt to, and perhaps even shape the emotional responses of
their audience. At each rung of the appellate ladder, pathetic argument
becomes attributable ever less to bias and ever more to social awareness.
Communicating this awareness improves both the democratic
responsiveness and the administrability of constitutional rules. Finally,
pathetic argument is unavoidable. Of course, that some phenomenon is
inevitable does not mean we should not seek to minimize its destructive
effects. But it does place the burden of persuasion on those who would
argue, in the face of professional evolution, that pathetic argument is never
appropriate.
Pathetic argument, like other forms, is context-specific. Overt appeals
to emotion are often inappropriate in constitutional argument, as
elsewhere in the law, and the appropriateness of such appeals necessarily
depends on the subject of the argument and the nature of the emotions
involved. It is not possible to impose a fixed dichotomy that specifies, by
rule, when pathetic argument is acceptable and when it is not, but we can
identify a set of factors likely to influence that judgment. First, it is useful
to distinguish emotional appeals in the service of an accepted subject of
constitutional argument from those that pertain solely to the ultimate
issue in the case. Modes of persuasion may, but need not, modify the
standard constitutional subjects. Thus, we can imagine pathetic historical
argument—see, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s recitation of John
Greenleaf Whittier’s patriotic ballad “Barbara Frietchie” in his Texas v.
Johnson dissent 21—just as we can imagine pathetic argument simpliciter:
“We should permit prohibitions on partial birth abortions because the
procedure is offensive and disgusting.” Pathetic argument as to the
ultimate issue fits less easily into the traditions of constitutional practice.
In addition to the subjects of pathetic constitutional argument, we
might also wish to know the kinds of emotion being invoked. Under the
now-dominant “cognitive theory” of emotions, our feelings are not
necessarily impulsive and ad hoc but often reflect a rational response to
information about the world.22 We are motivated to respond to external
20. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 683–85 (2012) (“While still frequently engaged in what we
could regard as little more than ordinary dispute resolution, the supreme Court’s law
declaration function has long since assumed overriding importance.”).
21. 491 U.S. 397, 424–25 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
22. See infra Part II.A (discussing feeling and cognitive theories of emotion respectively
defining emotions as associated with specific physical sensations or particular objects of
evaluation).
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stimuli not by logos but by pathos, and motivated action is necessary to the
vitality of constitutional law.23 Emotions such as love, anger, or shame
may produce both deliberation about the content of our commitments and,
just as important, action in the service of that deliberation. Emotions such
as jealousy, vengeance, or disgust might be less likely to produce
normatively desirable action.24 Or the opposite may be true.25 Or it may
just depend on context. In any event, it is worth doing the work needed to
distinguish more from less productive emotion-generated responses.
Other factors that might be relevant to whether pathetic argument is
appropriate include, as suggested above, whether the court’s role in a case
is better characterized as law-applying or law-announcing and whether
the writer is speaking for the court or solely for himself or a subset of the
court. Eccentricity in separate writing does less to damage the reputation
of the court, and dissenting opinions are, often self-consciously, efforts at
law reform. The closer the judge is to being an advocate, possessed of a
distinct role morality, the more license the judge may have to employ the
standard tools of legal advocates. Those tools have long included “jury
arguments,” so called even when they are presented to judges.26
This Article proceeds largely as outlined above. Part I introduces the
Peripatetic concept of pathos and identifies the traditional discomfort with
pathetic argument in constitutional law. Part II defines emotional appeals
and fits pathetic argument into existing accounts of constitutional
methodology, specifically those of Bobbitt and Fallon. Part III makes the
normative case for recognizing a role for pathetic argument in
constitutional law. Part IV assesses the epistemic and practical purchase of
identifying and accepting this approach to constitutional argument.
Appeals to logos and to ethos are relatively hierarchical approaches to
legal persuasion. Privileging recourse to logic over appeals to emotion
rewards higher education, formal language acquisition, and symbolic
thinking. Privileging ethical over pathetic appeal presupposes shared
reputational markers and implies an established cultural hegemony.
Critical theorists have long resisted legal formalism partly on these
23. Cf. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review 145–206 (2004) (describing ways in which “people out of doors” influenced
constitutional development through nineteenth century).
24. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 124–
71 (2004) (criticizing disgust’s role in creating legal norms).
25. See Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in The Passions of
Law 63–65 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (defending disgust as expressive emotion in criminal
law); Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in
The Passions of Law, supra, at 123, 124 (“[J]ustice itself is (in part) a matter of emotion
and . . . the desire for vengeance is basic to its concerns.”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 630–52 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan,
Alternative Sanctions] (advocating shaming as appropriate alternative sanction); Eric A.
Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 Geo. L.J. 1977, 1999 (2001) (arguing feelings of disgust
are unlikely to interfere with juror deliberations)..
26. See infra note 88.
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grounds.27 Identifying established pathetic practice, developing quality
controls, and thereby more generally recovering a legitimate space for
pathetic constitutional argument may help to address some of these
concerns even as they give rise to others. Attention to pathos, and
therefore to audience, in constitutional law carries the familiar risks that
attach to protestant approaches to constitutional construction.28 To the
degree these risks are merely the wages of self-understanding, they are
risks worth taking.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH PATHOS
Persuasion is vital to law and to democratic governance. The
importance of persuasion within these domains is precisely what led the
Ancient Greeks, the earliest democrats, to systematize and codify the
forms of rhetoric.29 Indeed, among Aristotle’s chief contributions was his
generalization of familiar concepts in legal rhetoric to nonlegal domains.30
In so doing, he emphasized the nonemotional, logical elements of
rhetoric.31 This Part discusses the very different modern American
understanding of pathetic argument as an element of legal and
constitutional practice. While emotional appeal remains a significant and
much discussed approach to legal argument across several areas, it is
generally dismissed as irrelevant or subversive in constitutional law and in
judicial practice more generally.
A. The Classical Conception
Its antiquity notwithstanding, Aristotle’s treatise On Rhetoric is the
seminal work on the art of persuasion. It is dissected, criticized, and
defended in modern courses on rhetoric, and a rhetorician’s relative

27. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 42 (1983)
[hereinafter Cover, Foreword] (“[T]o state the problem [to which courts respond] as one of
unclear law or difference of opinion about the law seems to presuppose that there is a
hermeneutic that is methodologically superior to those employed by the communities that
offer their own law.”); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 785 (1983) (challenging liberal
embrace of interpretivism and neutral principles on grounds that “only coherent basis for
their requisite continuities of history and meaning is found in the communitarian
assumptions of conservative social thought”).
28. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 29 (1988) (describing “protestant”
approach to constitutional interpretation as “based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation” as opposed to “catholic” position that
views Supreme Court as “dispenser of ultimate interpretation”).
29. See George A. Kennedy, Introduction to Aristotle, supra note 1, at 7–8 [hereinafter
Kennedy, Introduction] (describing occasions for use of civil rhetoric).
30. See id. at 9 (noting Aristotle criticized handbooks for concentration on judicial
situations).
31. See id.; see also Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 1, §§ 3–4 (“[P]ity and anger and
such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman.”).
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affinity with Aristotle continues to be her central defining characteristic.32
On Rhetoric identifies three pisteis, or modes of persuasion, already
discussed in brief: “[S]ome are in the character of the speaker [ēthos], and
some in disposing the listener in some way [pathos], and some in the
argument itself, by showing or seeming to show something [logos].”33
For Aristotle, then, persuasion depends importantly on the quality of
the inductive and deductive reasoning present in the argumentation (i.e.,
logos), but it also depends on the speaker’s success at demonstrating his
reputation and integrity (i.e., ethos) and on his skill at arousing the
emotions of his audience in favor of his position and against the position of
his opponent (i.e., pathos). A speaker must appear to have practical
wisdom, virtue, and good will, thereby establishing a measure of ethical
authority.34 For Aristotle, that authority was reflected in and thereby
emerged from the content of the speech—whether it was “spoken in such a
way as to make the speaker worthy of credence”—rather than from preexisting reputational markers such as wealth or status.35 This
understanding of ethical argument differs from that of many of its modern
discussants, but it was a crucial point for Aristotle, who believed ethos to
be “almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.”36
Aristotle devoted ten chapters of On Rhetoric to emotional appeal.37
He defined emotions as “those things through which, by undergoing
change, people come to differ in their judgments,”38 and so these chapters
offer primers on how a speaker arouses, within the listener, seven dyadic
sets of emotions or moods: anger or calmness; friendliness or enmity; fear
or confidence; shame or shamelessness; kindliness or unkindliness; pity or
indignation; envy or emulation.39 For example, after describing numerous
circumstances that tend to cause someone to be angry (e.g., “if someone
works against him and does not cooperate with him”40 or when others
“speak badly of, and scorn, things [he] take[s] most seriously”41), Aristotle
concludes the chapter on anger by saying, “[I]t is clear that it might be
needful in speech to put [the audience] in the state of mind of those who
are inclined to anger and to show one’s opponents as responsible for those
things that are the causes of anger.”42 In the chapter on fear, he writes,
32. See George A. Kennedy, Prooemion to Aristotle, supra note 1, at ix–x (describing
influence of Aristotelian rhetoric on modern rhetoric theorists).
33. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 3.
34. See id. bk. 2, ch. 1, § 5 (noting speaker with all these qualities will be “necessarily
persuasive to the hearers”).
35. Id. bk. 1, ch. 2, § 4 (footnote omitted).
36. Id.
37. See id. bk. 2, chs. 2–11.
38. Id. ch. 1, § 8.
39. See id. chs. 2–11.
40. Id. ch. 2, § 9.
41. Id. § 13.
42. Id. § 27.
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“[W]henever it is better [for a speaker’s case] that they [i.e., the audience]
experience fear, he should make them realize that they are liable to
suffering; for [he can say that] others even greater [than they] have
suffered.”43
Aristotle sought to disclaim exclusive or predominant reliance on
pathos as a mode of persuasion, but he conceded its significance. His
emphasis on pathetic argument maps onto his conception of rhetoric as
attuned not just to speaker (hence, ethos) and subject (hence, logos), but
also to audience (hence, pathos). The neo-Aristotelian philosopher Chaim
Perelman, in his well-known treatise The New Rhetoric, writes, “The great
orator, the one with a hold on his listeners, seems animated by the very
mind of his audience.”44 Plato dismissed the sophists for pandering to the
crowd, but Aristotle, even as he shared Plato’s criticisms, was a more
practical man. “[N]o orator, not even the religious orator,” Perelman
writes, “can afford to neglect this effort of adaptation to his audience.”45
B. Pathos in Modern Legal Practice
“Emotion pervades the law,”46 Susan Bandes writes, and there are
indeed legal contexts in which the use of emotional appeals is openly
acknowledged as legitimate and even celebrated. The most ready
examples emerge from criminal law. Our assessment of the gravity of
particular offenses and our sentencing practices reflect moral judgments
that may be inseparable from the emotions those judgments both validate
and produce.47 Thus, capital punishment relies on a theory of retribution
that seems to require emotionally attuned moral judgments about whether
death is deserved, or whether it is appropriate to express the community’s
outrage through the use of its ultimate sanction. We permit jurors to hear
evidence of the emotional impact on the victim’s family at the sentencing
phase of capital trials in order to “counteract[] the mitigating evidence
which the defendant is entitled to put in.”48 The sentencing phase thereby
becomes a deliberate effort to persuade the juror to internalize the pain
and suffering experienced by the victim’s family or to grant mercy to the

43. Id. ch. 5, § 15.
44. Ch. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation 24 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press
1969) (1958).
45. Id.
46. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to The Passions of Law, supra note 25, at 1
[hereinafter Bandes, Introduction].
47. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 13, at 355–56 (arguing emotion is unavoidable in
capital punishment context); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 270 (asserting emotions
are ubiquitous in criminal law and judgments of whether emotion is “reasonable” may
influence legal assessment).
48. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)).
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defendant in contemplation of the social benefits of his continued
existence or out of sympathy toward those his death would affect.
In Payne v. Tennessee, the case in which the Court permitted such
evidence,49 the sentencing jury heard testimony from the victim’s mother
recounting her young grandchild Nicholas’s response to the murder of his
mother, Charisse, and sister, Lacie Jo:
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she
doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to
me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do
you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried about
my Lacie.50
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor said:
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the
families involved in this case. . . . But there is something that you
can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up,
hopefully. He’s going to want to know what happened. And he is
going to know what happened to his baby sister and his mother.
He is going to want to know what type of justice was done. He is
going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you
will provide the answer.51
Rebutting the defendant’s closing argument, the prosecutor continued:
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the
chance to grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two
years old. So, no there won’t be a high school principal to talk
about Lacie Jo Christopher, and there won’t be anybody to take
her to her high school prom. And there won’t be anybody there—
there won’t be her mother there or Nicholas’ mother there to kiss
him at night. His mother will never kiss him good night or pat
him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing him a lullaby.52
For his part, the defendant presented testimony from a woman who
stated that he “was a very caring person, . . . that he devoted much time
and attention to her three children,” and that her children “had come to
love him very much and would miss him.”53
The rhetorical mode of both the prosecutor, overtly, and Payne’s
attorney, more subtly, was pathetic. The arguments violated neither
governing statues nor ethical rules and, after Payne, neither did they
violate the Constitution. Indeed, one of the aggravating circumstances for
imposition of the death penalty in Tennessee, as in many other states, is
49. The Payne Court overruled Booth and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989), which had held that admission of victim-impact evidence and argument at a capital
sentencing trial violated the Eighth Amendment.
50. Payne, 501 U.S. at 814–15.
51. Id. at 815.
52. Id. at 816.
53. Id. at 814.

2013]

PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1013

whether the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”54
Persuading a jury that a crime fits this description without appealing to the
jurors’ emotions is a neat trick that no one seriously expects prosecutors
to accomplish.55 As the Payne Court said, defending the use of victimimpact evidence, “[T]he testimony illustrated quite poignantly some of the
harm that Payne’s killing had caused.”56
Argumentation involving victim-impact evidence or death penalty
mitigation is not the only place where emotional appeal is a legitimate
element of criminal practice. Pleas for mercy based on childhood trauma,
dependent partners and children, good deeds, amicability, or other factors
liable to arouse the judge’s sympathy or pity are commonplace in criminal
sentencing. Outside the sentencing realm, gradation of criminal culpability
more generally requires an assessment of the defendant’s state of mind,
and so evidence related to the nature of any potential provocations or
possible grounds for sympathy or insanity are often admissible in criminal
trials.57 Defendants seeking to arouse contempt based on the provocative
actions of the homicide victim often advance an imperfect self-defense,
available at common law to defendants who committed a homicide out of a
good-faith belief that their life was in danger.58 Battered woman syndrome
is one version of this defense.59 Defenses of “honor” or “heat of passion”
54. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (2012); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345, 364 (1998) (noting most states
with capital punishment use version of heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator). The
Supreme Court has long required states to adopt a narrowing construction of this
aggravating factor in order to ensure that it is not so open-ended as to be arbitrary. See
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990) (finding construction of state statute sufficiently
narrow to meet constitutional muster), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1976) (same). For example, the
Tennessee instruction qualifies the aggravator in a typical way, with the phrase “in that it
involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5); see also State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 630 (La. 1984)
(noting to apply aggravating factor in Louisiana “there must exist evidence, from which the
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was torture or the pitiless infliction of
unnecessary pain on the victim”). This kind of language may constrain the scope of the
prosecutor’s presentation, but it neither requires nor invites dispassion.
55. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 13, at 359 (noting quintessential jury questions in
capital punishment cases are laden with emotion).
56. 501 U.S. at 826 (emphasis added). For a fuller discussion of the role of emotion in
victim-impact testimony, see generally Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13.
57. See Douglas N. Walton, Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam 174 (1997)
(“Because the state of the defendant’s mind is a relevant issue in this type of defense,
appeals to sympathy or compassion cannot be excluded from a criminal trial as irrelevant,
generally.”).
58. See id. at 175–76 (discussing pity-based argument in imperfect self-defense
context).
59. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident
on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11, 14–15 (1986) (“The defense is
designed to persuade the fact-finder that the defendant’s status as a battered woman
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killings are permitted to pursue similar strategies, to invite the jury to
experience the emotional disturbance that allegedly precipitated the
offense.60
The victim-impact example makes clear, however, that pathetic
argument in criminal law need not always be in the service of mitigation.
Sentencing hearings may involve statements by prosecutors crafted to
arouse contempt toward the accused or by the judge herself seeking to
instill shame or remorse in the defendant. Dan Kahan has argued that
criminal punishment itself often is and should be graduated not simply
based on the harm caused by the defendant’s acts or on the defendant’s
personal moral culpability but also, to paraphrase H.L.A. Hart, “‘as a means
of venting or emphatically expressing moral condemnation.’”61 Kahan
advocates shaming penalties as superior to alternative sanctions such as
fines and community service because shaming better captures the
expressive dimension of criminal punishment.62 Shaming penalties
typically involve gratuitous public exposure for crimes, such as solicitation
of a prostitute or sexual abuse of a child, that defy the community’s
conventional morality.63 It is impossible to argue in favor of a shaming
penalty or to impose one as a judge without recognizing and trading on the
fact that certain crimes arouse enmity or disgust among the public and,
when publicized, tend to deeply embarrass the perpetrator.
Pathetic argument does not receive unqualified acceptance even in
the contexts just discussed. The three-Justice plurality that announced the
opinion of the Court in Gardner v. Florida wrote, “It is of vital importance to
the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.”64 That statement routinely appears in death penalty opinions.65
Jurors in capital cases are frequently instructed that they are not to decide
renders reasonable her belief that self-help was justified [and she] should be acquitted . . .
.”); see also, e.g., State v. Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570, 573–74 (N.C. 1981) (permitting imperfect
self-defense theory to reduce first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter in case
involving battered woman defendant).
60. See Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
597, 601 (2004) (reviewing Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear
in the Criminal Courtroom (2003)) (“Through the defenses of provocation and self-defense
the law continues to empathize with violent men [by] defining reasonableness to mean
typicality and then permitting juries to find atypical conduct derived from typical emotions
sufficient as an excuse or justification.”).
61. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 25, at 596 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Law,
Liberty & Morality 65–66 (1963)).
62. See id. at 635–37 (explaining advantages of shaming punishments).
63. See id. at 631–34 (discussing four classes of shaming penalties—stigmatizing
publicity, literal stigmatization, self-debasement, and contrition).
64. 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
65. E.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 363 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 189 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lankford v. Idaho, 500
U.S. 110, 126 (1991).
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punishment based on sympathy,66 and the Court has rejected claims that
such an instruction prevents the jury from considering mitigating
evidence.67 Courts have recognized a difference between mercy (OK) and
sympathy (not OK),68 just as they have recognized a distinction between
retribution (OK) and vengeance (not OK).69
Still, to the degree that these are formally different concepts, the
ineluctable moral content of the criminal law means that, if the distinction
is intended to track the use or nonuse of pathetic argument, it is a fiction in
practice. A majority of the en banc Tenth Circuit addressed this tension in
Parks v. Brown, one of the cases in which the Supreme Court eventually
rejected a constitutional challenge to an antisympathy jury instruction70:
“Mercy,”
“humane”
treatment,
“compassion,”
and
consideration of the unique “humanity” of the defendant, which
have all been affirmed as relevant considerations in the penalty
phase of a capital case, all inevitably involve sympathy or are
sufficiently intertwined with sympathy that they cannot be parsed
without significant risk of confusion in the mind of a reasonable
juror.71
Even if these considerations are all conceptually different, jurors
cannot be expected to cleanse their minds of all emotion in applying them
to evidence. Likewise, advocates cannot be expected, and are not expected,
66. See Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 551, 569 (2011) [hereinafter Abrams, Emotions] (“A source of particular controversy
[is] the ‘anti-sympathy’ instruction frequently offered in capital cases, which informs the
jury that it ‘must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.’” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987))).
67. See Brown, 479 U.S. at 543 (“[A] rational juror could hardly hear this instruction
without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury’s deliberations to considerations
arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating.”); see also Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492–93 (1990) (rejecting defendant’s contention that anti-sympathy
instructions may cause jurors who react sympathetically to mitigating evidence to disregard
that evidence entirely).
68. Compare Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (“Whether a juror feels sympathy for a capital
defendant is more likely to depend on that juror’s own emotions than on the actual evidence
regarding the crime and the defendant.”), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989)
(“[S]o long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment is narrowed, there is no
constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy based on the
mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant.”), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
69. See Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(“In saying that ‘retribution’ can serve as a legitimate basis for imposing the death penalty,
the Supreme Court has recognized an important distinction between the two concepts that
the term might be held to embrace: the expression of moral outrage by a community; and
the exaction of blood vengeance.”).
70. The jury instruction read, in relevant part: “You must avoid any influence of
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence.”
Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1552 (10th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Saffle, 494 U.S. 484.
71. Id. at 1555–56 (emphasis added).
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to neglect the emotional dimensions of mercy and retribution in criminal
sentencing.
Pathetic argument may have greater purchase in criminal practice
than in other areas of legal advocacy, but if so, this is a difference in degree
only. Appeal to the emotions of the audience, whether judge or jury, has
been considered a legitimate, even essential aspect of legal advocacy at
least since the rise of the legal realists.72 Arthur Bachrach wrote in 1932
that “brief writing is essentially a creative function in just as real a sense as
writing dramas, novels, poems or short stories” and that the best
advocates possess “a clear, emotional, as well as intellectual
understanding” of the truth of their position.73
Modern guides to trial advocacy are replete with admonitions that a
good advocate must know her audience and must be willing to make
emotional appeals.74 For example, the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
litigation section in 2001 published The Winning Argument, written by
“some of the country’s leading trial attorneys,” the foreword of which
identifies its goal as “promot[ing] high standards of practice through
mentoring those who are less experienced.”75 Chapter Two, “Winning
Arguments Are Tailored to the Decision-Maker,” advises readers to
consider the audience’s attitudes, beliefs, and values, to “[a]ssociate [their]
case with [their] listener’s values,” and “[f]rame issues in emotionally
compelling terms.”76 Chapter Six, “Winning Arguments Appeal to
Emotion,” encourages advocates to “[r]ecognize that judges are subject to
emotion” and offers advice on how to tell a compelling story, how to be
“[s]ensitive to your listeners’ [f]eelings,” and how to develop “emotional
intelligence.”77 Paul Mark Sandler’s Anatomy of a Trial, also an ABA
publication, explicitly urges trial lawyers to rely on pathos in their opening
statements: “Histrionics are never appropriate,” he writes, “but opening
72. See Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing
Advice, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 10–12 (2010) (highlighting legal realist reaction against
neutral judicial reasoning). Defenses of pathetic argument of course predate the realists. In
Ancient Greece, handbooks on rhetoric advised legal advocates (who were then laypersons)
to use their closing arguments (epilogoi) to “seek to arouse the emotions of the jury.”
Kennedy, Introduction, supra note 29, at 9. Indeed, as Michael Frost writes, “What
distinguishes the Greek and Roman analyses of legal discourse from modern analyses is
their consistent focus on audience, the depth and detail of their analysis, and their candid
discussions of how to manipulate judges and juries.” Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1994).
73. Arthur C. Bachrach, Reflections on Brief Writing, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 374, 377–78 (1932).
74. See Frost, supra note 72, at 85 (suggesting importance of understanding audience
and appealing to emotion is often overlooked); see also Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot
Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 Legal Writing 127, 135 (2008) (“[A]n appellate
brief writer who overlooks the emotional appeal of her case does so at her client’s great
peril.”).
75. Robert A. Clifford, Foreword to Ronald Waicukauski, Paul Mark Sandler & JoAnne
Epps, The Winning Argument, at iii (2001).
76. Waicukauski, Sandler & Epps, supra note 75, at 32.
77. Id. at 86–89.
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statements should make some emotional pull on the audience, however
subtle.”78 Advocates can appeal to emotion, for example, through
modulation of their tone and volume, judicious use of storytelling, making
eye contact, and body language more generally.79 These suggestions are, of
course, of a piece with approaches to persuasion outside of legal contexts.
In introducing his treatise on argumentum ad misericordiam (“appeal to
pity”), the rhetorician Douglas Walton writes that people accept appeals to
pity in all kinds of cases—in trials, immigration hearings, parole cases,
charitable appeals for aid, public relations campaigns on behalf of causes
like animal rights, and all sorts of other causes.80
There is indeed reason to believe such appeals should be more
prevalent in certain legal contexts than in lay contexts. In an adversarial
system, the attorney owes an ethical obligation of zealous representation
to his client. Norms of representation in the United States extend that duty
to ends that plainly transcend customary moral boundaries.81 Thus,
Monroe Freedman concludes that a criminal defense attorney has a duty to
seek to undermine the credibility of a witness he knows to be truthful;82
that he is required to put the defendant on the stand even if he knows she
will commit perjury;83 and that he must offer truthful legal advice even if
he knows that the client will use the information obtained to commit
perjury or other crimes.84 Professional responsibility rules address each of
these situations, and they are much debated within the profession, but to
the degree governing ethics rules diverge from Freedman’s conclusions,
they go no farther than to permit (rather than require) an attorney to
mitigate the zealotry of his representation.85 It is this normative posture of
78. Paul Mark Sandler, Anatomy of a Trial: A Handbook for Young Lawyers 33 (2011).
79. See id. at 34.
80. Walton, supra note 57, at xiii.
81. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study xx, 52 (1988) (describing
distinction between “role morality” and “common morality” and resultant lack of
accountability to moral obligations created by adversary system); Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 63–66 (1980) (providing
commentary on distinction between “professional responsibility” and “ordinary morality”);
see also Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to
Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 129 (1994) (finding only around
half of surveyed New Jersey lawyers disclosed client intentions to commit unlawful acts
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm in situations in which state professional
responsibility rules mandated disclosure).
82. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469, 1475 (1966).
83. Id. at 1477–78.
84. Id. at 1479–80.
85. For instance see, respectively, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2010) (“A
lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may . . . so defend the proceeding as to require that every
element of the case be established.”); id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence,
other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false.”); id. R. 1.2(d) (“[A] lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
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barely qualified respect for the client’s ends that leads Daniel Markovits to
conclude that lawyers “unfairly prefer their clients over others and,
moreover, serve their clients in ways that implicate common vices with
familiar names: most notably, lawyers lie and cheat.”86 One need not adopt
Markovits’s position in full to concede that, at a minimum, an American
lawyer’s professional duties at least permit and may require him to offer a
pathetic argument whenever he believes such an argument is more likely
than not to advance his client’s interests.
Most of the situations described above pertain most directly to
lawyers trying to win cases or otherwise secure favorable outcomes before
judges and juries. As discussed, a willingness to advance pathetic
arguments may well fit within the role morality of a legal advocate,
particularly a trial advocate, in an adversarial system. It is more
controversial, though hardly unheard of,87 to assume a similar duty in the
appellate context, in which the audience comprises judges and in which
the subject of discussion tends to focus on questions of law rather than
fact.88 It is far more controversial to say that judges should themselves use
emotional appeals in the course of writing opinions. It is more
controversial still to assert that there may a legitimate place for emotional
appeals within the opinion of a judge deciding a constitutional interpretive
question (as opposed, say, to conducting a sentencing hearing). The next
section substantiates those claims. Note, however, that the argument to
this point already complicates the view that pathos has no place at all in
legal argument, including in constitutional argument. The principal
rationale for appealing to emotion before a judge in a criminal case or in
an ordinary civil action—namely, that such an appeal may succeed—
applies equally to appellate argument and to constitutional adjudication,
even if the likely payoff of such an argument is smaller. And so the case
against pathetic argument in constitutional cases, if it is to persuade, must
derive from the particular role morality of constitutional judges.
C. Pathos in Constitutional Judging
Overt appeal to emotion is as scandalous in judging as it is prevalent
in trial advocacy treatises. The tone of the opposition to emotion is evident
in the discourse surrounding the 2009 Supreme Court nomination of Sonia
Sotomayor, which revolved around the related but distinct issue of the role
of “empathy” and “compassion” in judicial decisionmaking. After Justice
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”).
86. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics 25 (2008).
87. See Chestek, supra note 74, at 130 (describing value of empathy in appellate
advocacy generally); Frost, supra note 72, at 85 (noting existence of only limited scholarship
on role of emotion in appellate discourse).
88. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading
Judges 31–32 (2008) (arguing appeal to emotion is “jury argument” that should not figure
into advocacy before judges).

2013]

PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1019

Souter retired, President Obama said, “I view that quality of empathy, of
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles, as an
essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”89 In his
statement nominating then-Judge Sotomayor to the Court, Obama said that
personal experiences “can give a person a common touch and a sense of
compassion; an understanding of how the world works and how ordinary
people live. And that is why it is a necessary ingredient in the kind of
justice we need on the Supreme Court.”90
President Obama’s remarks do not directly address the role of
pathetic argument in judging. Whether a judge is motivated by emotion in
reaching decisions is distinct from whether she seeks to appeal to emotion
in announcing them. But the reaction to the President’s remarks, viewed in
combination with the reaction to other controversial statements made by
Judge Sotomayor, help to diagnose the perceived problem with pathos
playing any role in the judicial process.
Judge Sotomayor made at least three comments that combined with
President Obama’s empathy discussion to create a meme of judicial
lawlessness that grounded criticism of the nomination. Most famously, at a
speech in 2001, Sotomayor said, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a
better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”91 In the
same speech, she said, “I willingly accept that we who judge must not deny
the differences resulting from experience and heritage, but attempt . . .
continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are
appropriate.”92 Four years later, at a panel discussion in 2005, Judge
Sotomayor said that a “court of appeals is where policy is made. And I
know—I know this is on tape, and I should never say that because we
don’t make law. I know. O.K. I know. I’m not promoting it. I’m not
advocating it.”93
All of these remarks—President Obama’s invocations of empathy and
compassion, Judge Sotomayor’s suggestion that her status as a Latina was
relevant to her decisionmaking, and her belief that appellate judges make
policy—played important and interrelated roles in the nomination hearing
and its surrounding discourse. Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, then the
ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, singled out each of
those remarks in his opening statement at the hearing. It is worth quoting
89. Peter Baker, In Search for New Justice, Empathy, or at Least ‘Empathy,’ Is Out, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12.
90. Barack Obama, Remarks by President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the
United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-nominating-judge-sonia-sotomayor-united-states-supremecourt (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
91. Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. Times, May 15,
2009, at A21.
92. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2009, at A1.
93. Savage, supra note 91.

1020

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:####

his statement at some length, as it efficiently encapsulates a basic
criticism:
[O]ur legal system is based on a firm belief in an ordered
universe and objective truth. The trial is the process by which the
impartial and wise judge guides us to the truth.
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where words
have no true meaning and judges are free to decide what facts
they choose to see. In this world, a judge is free to push his or her
own political or social agenda. . . .
....
I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted . . . as a
result of President Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical
ingredient for a judge is the “depth and breadth of one’s
empathy,” as well as . . . “their broader vision of what America
should be.”
Like the American people, I have watched this process for a
number of years, and I fear that this “empathy standard” is
another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented,
and relativistic world where laws lose their fixed meaning,
unelected judges set policy, [and] Americans are seen as
members of separate groups rather than as simply Americans . . . .
So we have reached a fork in the road . . . and there are stark
differences.
I want to be clear:
I will not vote for—and no [S]enator should vote for—an
individual nominated by any President who is not fully
committed to fairness and impartiality toward every person who
appears before them.
I will not vote for—and no Senator should vote for—an
individual nominated by any President who believes it is
acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background,
gender, prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor
of, or against, parties before the court. In my view, such a
philosophy is disqualifying.
Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling
the game is not neutral, but instead feels empowered to favor one
team over the other.
Call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but
whatever it is, it is not law. In truth, it is more akin to politics, and
politics has no place in the courtroom.94
For Senator Sessions, empathy is a code word for sympathy, which is
a code word for prejudice. The prevalence of these qualities in judges calls
to Sessions’s mind a legal dystopia characterized by moral relativism,

94. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6–7 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
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subjectivity, discretion, activism, opportunism, cultural pluralism, and
partiality; in a word, bias.
The fear runs even deeper than this. It is not merely that emotional
influence risks improper favoritism for one party over another, or risks
injecting politics into legal decisionmaking. It is that denying emotion a
place within the rule of law counters a cognitive bias in favor of the visible
over the invisible, and short over long-term consequences. John Hasnas
makes the point thus:
The law consists of abstract rules because we know that, as
human beings, judges are unable to foresee all of the long-term
consequences of their decisions and may be unduly influenced by
the immediate, visible effects of these decisions. The rules of law
are designed in part to strike the proper balance between the
interests of those who are seen and those who are not seen. The
purpose of the rules is to enable judges to resist the emotionally
engaging temptation to relieve the plight of those they can see
and empathize with, even when doing so would be unfair to those
they cannot see.
Calling on judges to be compassionate or empathetic is in
effect to ask them to undo this balance and favor the seen over
the unseen . . . . [I]f the difference between the bad judge and the
good judge is that the bad judge focuses on the visible effects of
his or her decisions while the good judge takes into account both
the effects that can be seen and those that are unseen, then the
compassionate, empathetic judge is very likely to be a bad
judge.95
The problem Hasnas identifies is not just an ethical problem but
implicates the judge’s technical competence as well. The empathetic judge
faces serious cognitive limitations even when empathy is viewed in its best
possible light.
The point is important because, better than the concern with bias that
Sessions focuses on, it responds to a standard move by Sotomayor’s
defenders: the claim that her critics elided the distinction between
empathy and sympathy.96 Empathy is best understood as a cognitive
capacity rather than as an emotion as such.97 It is “the ability to

A15.

95. John Hasnas, Op-Ed, The Unseen Deserve Empathy Too, Wall St. J., May 29, 2009, at

96. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89 (“Empathy means being able to imagine oneself in
the condition or predicament of another, while sympathy means sharing the feelings of
another to the point of compassion or pity.” (paraphrasing remarks by Pamela Karlan)).
97. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 637 (“Empathy can be defined not as an emotion but
rather a capacity to imagine the world from the perspective of another.”); Susan A. Bandes,
Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. de•novo 133, 136 (describing
empathy as ability to take “‘imaginative leap into the mind of others’”) (quoting Candace
Clark, Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life 34 (1997)).
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understand and share the feelings of another”98 as distinguished from
“feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s misfortune.”99 Defenders of
an empathy standard wanted to emphasize that they rejected formalism,
not neutrality, and that a judge should appreciate to the fullest extent
possible the law’s effects on real people. Hasnas’s response defends
formalism as a prophylactic safeguard of neutrality, promulgating the idea
that we cannot help but to empathize selectively. Moreover, empathy
invites sympathy even if it does not compel it. Adam Smith wrote that
when we imagine ourselves in the position of another person, “[P]assion
arises in our breast from the imagination.”100 What is the use of a capacity
to understand another’s feelings if a judge then refuses to permit those
feelings to influence her behavior? Should judges aspire to empathize
“better” or not at all?
The basis for Bobbitt’s criticism of pathetic argument as reflecting
“the idiosyncratic, personal traits”101 is now clearer. If the trial advocacy
guides are to be believed, appeal to pathos is most likely to succeed where
the advocate is able to use emotion to form a bond with his audience. The
Winning Argument recounts the strategy of the great English advocate
James Scarlett: “It was said that the secret of his success was that he
blended his mind with the minds of the jurors. Their thoughts were his
thoughts.”102 It is for this reason that the book advises advocates to
“[a]ssociate [their] case with [the] listener’s values”103 and to “share the
emotional response [they] seek” in the audience.104 Anatomy of a Trial
advises that lawyers should “avoid emotional appeals unless you can feel
the emotion yourself.”105
The critical response to the Sotomayor nomination suggests, however,
that emotion is undisciplined and leads to prejudice and subjectivity. That
judges should not only abide but should also assimilate themselves to the
passions of the people seems precisely backwards. Hasnas’s allusion to the
relationship between emotion and time calls to mind Alexander Bickel’s
proposition that “government under law” means that “government should
serve not only what we conceive from time to time to be our immediate

98. Concise Oxford American Dictionary 294 (Erin McKean et al. eds., 2006) (defining
“empathy”).
99. Id. at 921 (defining “sympathy”).
100. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments ch. 1, § 1, para. 10 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
101. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 95.
102. Waicukauski, Sandler & Epps, supra note 75, § 2.01, at 12.
103. Id. § 3.03, at 32.
104. Id. § 6.03, at 88.
105. Sandler, supra note 78, at 34; cf. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 16 (1993)
(describing ideal lawyer-statesman as possessing “qualities as much of feeling as of
thought”).

2013]

PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1023

material needs but also certain enduring values,”106 and that “judges have,
or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the
ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.”107 Bickel sought
to justify the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review; on this view,
disciplined thinkers have far less need to be checked by judges. The
received wisdom is that “emotion has a certain narrowly defined place in
law,” Bandes writes.108 “It is assigned to the criminal courts. It is confined
to those—like witnesses, the accused, the public—without legal
training.”109 A good judge enforces distance between law and the
incautious emotionalism of the public: “[I]t is portrayed as crucially
important to narrowly delineate that finite list and those proper roles, so
that emotion doesn’t encroach on the true preserve of law: which is
reason.”110
This Article began with a discussion of Justice Blackmun and the
tension between his opinions in Roe and DeShaney. Justice Blackmun’s
retirement was attended by the usual fond remembrances that follow an
important figure’s withdrawal from public life.111 Writing in the New
Republic, however, Jeffrey Rosen decided to say what many believed.112
After describing Justice Blackmun’s kind and generous personal
disposition, Rosen wrote:
But feeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and the
qualities that made Blackmun an admirable man ultimately
condemned him to be an ineffective justice. By reducing so many
cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify his
impulses with principled legal arguments, Blackmun showed the
dangers of the jurisprudence of sentiment.113
Rosen singled out two objectionable features of Justice Blackmun’s
jurisprudence: “particularism—focusing on the human consequences of
106. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 24 (Yale Univ. Press 1986)
(1962).
107. Id. at 25–26.
108. Bandes, Introduction, supra note 46, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see Maroney, supra note 4, at 631 (“[T]o call a judge emotional is a stinging
insult, signifying a failure of discipline, impartiality, and reason.”); cf. Scalia & Garner, supra
note 88, at 32 (“Good judges pride themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the
suppression of their personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions. And bad
judges want to be regarded as good judges. So either way, overt appeal to emotion is likely
to be regarded as an insult.”).
111. E.g., Ann Alpers, Tribute: Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1994);
Harold Hongju Koh, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
112. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1421, 1434 (1995) (calling several of Justice Blackmun’s more sentimental
opinions, including DeShaney, “embarrassing performances precisely because they seem the
unmediated expression of self”). Posner wrote the lower court opinion that DeShaney
affirmed. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
113. Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry
Blackmun, New Republic, May 2, 1994, at 13.
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every decision” and “compassion—a more abstract commitment to
dramatizing the plight of the poor and the downtrodden, without
reference to actual individuals.”114 Rosen argued that Blackmun’s
sentimentality took both forms at different times and simultaneously
reflects a lack of sophistication and a basic lawlessness.115
Rosen echoes common themes that help constitute Maroney’s
“cultural script of judicial dispassion.” But his conclusion that Blackmun’s
sentimentality reduced his effectiveness might be too quick. There is
remarkable consensus among supporters and opponents of abortion rights
that Roe is an unsuccessful opinion.116 Many conservatives fault the
opinion for failing to treat with due gravity the state’s emotionally
invested interest in the potential life of the fetus.117 It is considered
unsuccessful by many liberals in part because it is, in Michael Dorf’s words,
“emotionally empty,”118 deaf to the personal crisis of conscience that faces
women (not doctors) burdened by an unwanted pregnancy. By contrast,
“Poor Joshua!,” a dissent, continues to be invoked in popular media,119 in
books and scholarly articles,120 and in classrooms,121 and remains the
public face of the DeShaney decision. Herbert Eastman, a legal services
lawyer and clinician writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1995, cited Justice
Blackmun’s dissent as the kind of opinion that helps to sustain public
interest litigators who face significant doctrinal obstacles:
[A]s Clarence Darrow often observed, in these agonizing cases
where courts can hide behind law, there is always one judge or
juror who will not. There may be more than one who will listen
114. Id. at 14.
115. See id.
116. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in What Roe
v. Wade Should Have Said 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (discussing how Roe remains source of
political and legal controversy).
117. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time,
78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 995, 996–97 (2003) (“[T]he regime created in Roe . . . creates an
essentially unrestricted substantive legal right of some human beings to kill—murder,
really, since the power is plenary and requires no serious justification for its exercise—other
human beings, at a rate of approximately a million and a half a year.”) (footnotes omitted).
118. Michael C. Dorf, In Praise of Justice Blackmun: (Corrected) Typos and All, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 1397, 1399 (1999).
119. E.g., Bob Egelko, Head Against Heart in Pot Case: Supreme Court Reviews Local
Law, S.F. Chron. (Jan. 9. 2005, 4:00 am), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Headagainst-heart-in-pot-case-Supreme-Court-2739879.php#photo-2184644 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Charles Lane, Court Tackles Town’s Role in Child Safety, Wash. Post,
Mar. 21, 2005, at A2.
120. E.g., Lynne Curry, The DeShaney Case: Child Abuse, Family Rights, and the
Dilemma of State Intervention 127, 130 (2007); Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and
Back Again: The Failure of the Legal and Social Services Communities to Protect Foster
Children, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 946 (2005).
121. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Remembering a Justice Who Cared, Trial, May 1999, at
92, 92 (noting he reads Justice Blackmun’s DeShaney dissent aloud whenever he teaches
case).
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to . . . the social context of the problems facing our clients, the
identity of our clients and their stories, the wall of “us/them”
separating our clients from the court and from us, and our own
voices—our own response to the tragedies we witness.122
If Justice Blackmun’s appeal in DeShaney was wrong, as many of the
arguments in this Part suggest, it was not for lack of effectiveness.
II. THE PLACE OF PATHOS
In their treatise on persuading judges, Antonin Scalia and Bryan
Garner explain that they “strongly” reject the notion that advocates should
make emotional appeals to judges, but that it is “essential” to appeal to a
judge’s “sense of justice.”123 This Article’s principal subject diverges from
theirs, but we may likewise wish to distinguish judicial appeals to the
reader’s emotion from an appeal to her sense of justice, the latter of which
we may presume to be uncontroversial. This Part seeks to define
emotional appeals and to reconcile their use in constitutional opinions
with prevailing descriptive accounts of constitutional argument. It
concludes that pathetic argument is both identifiable and significant in
United States constitutional law, but that such argument, like ethical
argument, is better described as a mode of persuasion than as an
archetype of constitutional argument.
A. Pathos Defined
It is common ground among scholars of the affective sciences that the
border between emotions and other cognitive processes is and always will
be disputed.124 Efforts to outline the basic contours of the category we
associate with the label of “emotions” tend to begin with our own
experiences and intuitions.125 In determining what does and does not
qualify as an emotion or an emotional response, scholars begin by
identifying the core conceptions of the category, try to describe the
characteristics of those ideal conceptions, and then seek to extrapolate.126
Research into facial expressions suggests that across a broad range of
Western and non-Western cultures people associate particular

122. Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 854–55 (1995).
123. Scalia & Garner, supra note 88, at 31–32.
124. See Bandes, Introduction, supra note 46, at 10. The scholarship on emotion is vast
and unwieldy, ranging across fields as diverse as psychology, philosophy, economics,
neurology, anthropology, and biology. The impossibility of confining emotion scholarship to
one field itself reflects the difficulty in arriving at a shared definition of emotion. See
generally Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (1997) (arguing emotion describes
phenomena too diverse to be captured by one term).
125. See Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 9.
126. See id.
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expressions with happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise.127
Any theoretical account that seeks to define emotions must account for
and resonate with our experience of these standard emotions, but it is
difficult to say much else without courting significant controversy.
Aristotle described emotions broadly as “those things through which,
by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments.”128 This
definition is not helpful in distinguishing emotions from other dynamic
mental processes that influence individual decision making, but it is not
yet clear that it needs to articulate that distinction. Arriving at a working
definition of emotion is only instrumental, for our purposes, to
understanding what is meant by an appeal to emotion in the context of a
judicial decision. And so a definition of emotion is only useful to the degree
that it helps us answer this second question. Thus, it is common ground
that anger is an emotion, but in evaluating a judge’s appeal to the reader’s
anger, it should matter, it seems, what the object of that anger is. Anger at
the frailty of the majority’s logic is, plausibly, an emotion any dissenter
should wish to stir. Upon reflection one may conclude that criticism of
pathetic argument is directed not at the manipulation of “emotion” as such
but rather at the context in which such argument occurs: the valence or
character of the particular emotions evoked, the objects at which they are
directed, and the rationales offered or implied in invoking them. If this is
so, Aristotle’s definition may well suffice.
It is doubtful, though, that critics of pathetic argument would accept
this deconstructive move. Garner and Scalia have something in mind when
they suggest that an appeal to one’s sense of justice is importantly
different from an appeal to emotion, and so it is worth spending some time
with the literature to see whether we can uncover what that something is.
The sprawling literature seeking to develop a taxonomy of emotion and to
understand its basic ontology is not easily summarized, and I will not
attempt to do so here.129 It is both fruitful and manageable, however, to
contrast two different, broad understandings of emotion: the “feeling
theory” and the cognitive view. Doing so will help to clarify why a
definition of emotion adequate to construct a true dichotomy between
emotional appeals and appeals to one’s sense of justice is unlikely to
emerge from the literature.

127. Paul Ekman & Dacher Keltner, Universal Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Old
Controversy and New Findings, in Nonverbal Communication: Where Nature Meets Culture
27, 31–33 (Ullica Sergestråle & Peter Molnár eds., 1997).
128. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 8.
129. For a learned and helpful effort, see generally Ronald de Sousa, Emotion, Stanford
Encyclopedia
of
Philosophy
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Spring
2012),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/emotion/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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The first understanding of emotion we will consider is the so-called
“feeling theory,” commonly associated with the work of William James.130
Taking as his subject those emotions often linked with some physiological
bodily response, James challenged the notion that what he called the
“standard” emotions arise out of some independent mental process and
subsequently produce the associated physical response. Rather it is the
reverse: We apply a label to the feeling associated with a particular
physical sensation:
Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we
meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival,
are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says
that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state
is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily
manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the
more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry,
angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that
we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful,
as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the
perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale,
colourless, destitute of emotional warmth.131
James believed that emotions such as “[s]urprise, curiosity, rapture,
fear, anger, lust, [and] greed” are conventional labels that we apply to
mental states produced by “bodily disturbances”132—the furrowing of the
brow associated with worry, the lump in the throat tied to shame, the
perspiration of fear, and so forth.133 James arrived at this view through a
kind of thought experiment in which he sought to imagine the mental
states that carry the labels of various emotions without any attendant
physical manifestations and found that he could not. Experiencing some
phenomenon as “funny” is inseparable from the physical response of
laughter.134 Likewise, one cannot extract any abstract concept of rage
away from its physical manifestations, from “flushing of the face,” “dilation
of the nostrils,” and “clenching of the teeth.”135 According to James, “[a]
purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.”136
If emotions have no substance independent of their associated
physical feelings, then how do we know that the feeling precedes the
130. See William James, What Is an Emotion?, 9 Mind 188, 188–205 (1884) (arguing
emotional brain-processes are sensorial brain-processes variably combined); see also Carl
Georg Lange & William James, The Emotions (1922) (collecting essays by James and Lange
explicating their view). A variation on the feeling theory is also associated with David Hume,
see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (John P. Wright et al. eds., Everyman
Paperbacks 2003) (1739).
131. James, supra note 130, at 190.
132. See id. at 189.
133. See id. at 192–93.
134. See id. at 193.
135. Id. at 194.
136. Id.
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emotion rather than vice versa? James answers this with another
anecdotal observation, namely that experiencing the bodily changes
associated with emotions tends to make our perception of them more
acute, as when crying intensifies our pain or moping amplifies our
sadness.137 James further discusses the experiences of people
experiencing depression or paranoia, who may easily dissociate their
perceived feeling from their cognitive response to some stimulus but who
nonetheless find themselves in the grip of overwhelming physical
sensations or disturbances.138
On the feeling theory of emotion just described, an intentional appeal
to emotion can only be understood as an attempt to excite one of the
physical states that we associate with emotions. But describing such an
effort as ipso facto objectionable in the context of appeals to or by judges
runs headlong into the most trenchant objection to the feeling theory
within the philosophical literature: that emotions tend to have intentional
objects and to presuppose cognitive propositions about those objects.139
On this view, fear of death and fear of spiders are different emotions; the
content of the emotion cannot be explained or understood unless we know
something about death and about spiders (and likely about the individual’s
personal history). Describing someone as euphoric without associating
that euphoria with some object of evaluation—a new job, a new lover, a
successful exam performance, and so on—may describe a mood or an
appetite but not an emotion. At a minimum, some emotions (love, say)
have propositional objects that are integral to the emotion’s genetic
structure, and so it will not do to condemn “emotion” as necessarily
severable, for example, from one’s sense of justice.140
For simplicity, I will associate the cognitive view with Nussbaum, who
explicates a version in great detail in her 2001 book Upheavals of
Thought.141 On Nussbaum’s account, emotions cover a diverse set of
phenomena but they are distinct from the rote physical manifestations
James linked to them in four ways. First, as discussed, they are “about
something: they have an object,”142 and the emotion’s identity depends on
its object. Feelings of envy or hope, for example, are unintelligible apart

137. See id. at 197–98.
138. See id. at 199–200.
139. See Demian Whiting, The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed
Emotions, 19 Eur. J. Phil. 281, 282 (2009) (explaining objection to feeling theory based on
intentional objects of emotions).
140. Cf. Posner, Think, supra note 10, at 106 (“Indignation at a wrong is consistent
with corrective justice; sympathy for a litigant is not.”).
141. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11. This view has many variants. See generally,
e.g., Jerome Neu, A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion (2000); Robert C.
Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions (1984); George Pitcher,
Emotion, 74 Mind 326 (1965).
142. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 27 (emphasis omitted).
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from their objects.143 Second, the object is “intentional” in that it is
experienced subjectively by the person bearing the emotion,144 and that
person’s subjectivity in view of the object is integral to distinguishing one
emotion from another.145 Different individuals may form different
emotions in relation to identical objects.146 Third, emotions are
evaluative: They “embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but
beliefs—often very complex—about the object.”147 Thus, for Nussbaum,
“to have anger, I must have an even more complex set of beliefs: that some
damage has occurred to me or to something or someone close to me; that
the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone;
probably, that it was done willingly.”148 One’s evaluation may be excessive
or inappropriate in relation to prevailing social norms, or even false in
relation to one’s other beliefs,149 but the evaluation itself is nonetheless
critical to identifying the phenomenon as some particular emotion rather
than as another that shares a physiological manifestation.150 Fourth,
emotions involve a perception of value in their objects; the object is
viewed as important to the person’s individual flourishing.151 This quality
attaches even when that sense of value is inconsistent with one’s
“reflective ethical beliefs.”152
Nussbaum defends both the view that emotion is a kind of judgment
and the counterintuitive view that there is nothing more to emotion than
judgment.153 Many cognitivists resist the latter proposition.154 For
example, Peter Goldie argues that our deeply subjective experience of
143. See id. at 35.
144. Id. at 27.
145. See id. at 27–28 (suggesting people attach different emotions to objects
depending on their internal perceptions).
146. Think, for example, how winners and losers form different emotions in response
to the same sporting event. See Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore & Allan Collins, The
Cognitive Structure of Emotions 4 (1988) (“[I]n a very real sense, both the winners and the
losers are reacting to the same objective event. It is their construals of the event that are
different.”).
147. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 28.
148. Id. at 28–29.
149. See id. at 35–36 (describing how false beliefs can be retained in face of
contradictory knowledge).
150. See id. at 29–30 (arguing “[o]nly an inspection of the thoughts discriminates”
between different emotions).
151. See id. at 30–31.
152. Id. at 52.
153. See id. at 43–45 (arguing “not only that judgments of the sort we have described
are necessary constituent elements in the emotion, but also that they are sufficient”).
Nussbaum argues that emotion-based judgments result from vivid and intimate
visualizations of their objects: “[T]he emotions typically have a connection to imagination,
and to the concrete picturing of events in imagination.” Id. at 65.
154. See, e.g., Richard Wollheim, On the Emotions 10 (1999) (“[I]magination can
induce a particular emotional state in someone who does not have the emotional disposition
that state would ordinarily manifest.”).
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emotion involves a “feeling towards” the emotion’s object that cannot be
rationally articulated as a belief, desire, or judgment, and that varies
widely between individuals, but is nonetheless intelligible.155 The
important point is that the dominant view among contemporary
philosophers is that there is a kind of intelligence to emotions. They are
not visceral and arbitrary, as is sometimes supposed; like thoughts and
other cognitive instruments, they can be rational or irrational, based on
accurate or inaccurate perceptions of one’s environment, consistent with
one’s general constellation of beliefs, desires, and values or not.156
It is not obvious what view of emotions those who criticize pathetic
judicial argument have in mind, nor is it obvious whether they have any
particular view in mind. There is reason to believe, however, that some
version of the cognitive theory captures those critics’ working premise
better than the feelings theory. If emotions are merely conventional labels
for physical feelings, then it is enigmatic to say that an argument is
“appealing” to emotion at all. We would as soon pop a balloon behind the
listener’s head. But dominant varieties of the cognitive theory assume that
emotions may be judged appropriate or inappropriate, may be learned or
unlearned, and are, in a qualified way, predictable. The feelings theory
does not necessarily deny these possibilities, but it is at least easier to
agree that emotions are malleable in these ways if one also believes that
emotions are partly constituted by particularized intentional objects and
involve value judgments about those objects.
In any event, in order to accept the simple view that judicial appeals
to emotion are categorically inappropriate, one likely must adopt the
corollary that emotions and rational judgment are never mutually
dependent.157 On this view, it is never the case that a phenomenon fairly
labeled an emotion is integral to individuals’ normative assessments of
propositions of law. This view is radical158 and, as Part II.B shows, is likely
not the view underlying the objection to pathetic argument in
constitutional law. Moreover, as Part III.A seeks to demonstrate, holding
the unusual position just described is necessary but not sufficient to make

155. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration 19 (2002).
156. See generally Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 275–301 (contrasting
“mechanistic” and “evaluative” conceptions of emotion).
157. Alternatively, one might adopt the related view that emotions and rational
judgment are mutually dependent rarely enough that a prophylactic rule prohibiting
pathetic arguments is sensible.
158. Arguably, James did not himself hold this view. Recall that he limited his inquiry
to emotions that have “a distinct bodily expression.” James, supra note 130, at 189. He
conceded that there are “feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement,
bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for their
consequence,” but he concluded that in the absence of any such expression “such a judgment
is rather to be classed among awarenesses of truth: it is a cognitive act.” Id. at 189, 202
(emphasis omitted). It may be, then, that the difference between James and at least some
cognitivists is semantic.
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out a normative case against all instances of pathetic argument in
constitutional law.
B. Pathos and Constitutional Argument
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,159 the
Court upheld most of Pennsylvania’s abortion regulations but refused to
overrule Roe v. Wade.160 Justice Scalia ended his partial concurrence with
a description of the portrait of Roger Taney that hangs in the Caspersen
Room of the Harvard Law School Library. “There is a poignant aspect to
today’s opinion,” Justice Scalia wrote, referring to the length and tone of
the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, which sought
to leverage the Court’s credibility to help settle the national controversy
over abortion rights.161 He continued:
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze
that hangs in the Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney,
painted in 1859, the 82d year of his life, the 24th of his Chief
Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott. He is all in
black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon
a pad of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply, almost
lifelessly, beside the inner arm of the chair. He sits facing the
viewer, and staring straight out. There seems to be on his face,
and in his deep set-eyes, an expression of profound sadness and
disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked that way, even when
dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But those of us who
know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be
eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had that
case—its already apparent consequences for the Court and its
soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation—burning on
his mind. I expect that two years earlier he, too, had thought
himself “call[ing] the contending sides of national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution.”162
Justice Scalia’s opinion is an example of pathetic argument. It is not
paradigmatically so, like “Poor Joshua!,” but its mode of persuasion is
pathetic all the same.163 It advances a legal argument: affirming a
constitutional right to abortion is akin to affirming a constitutional right to
keep slaves in federal territories. But the argument is occluded beneath a
thick layer of pathos. Justice Scalia, a skilled rhetorician, means to compare
the visage of Roger Taney, a villain within the American constitutional
narrative, with the joint opinion. He knows that showing rather than
159. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 1001–02.
163. Bandes writes: “Emotion tends to seem like part of the landscape when it’s
familiar, and to become more visible when it’s unexpected.” Bandes, Introduction, supra
note 46, at 11.
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telling us that abortion is like slavery and that Roe is like Dred Scott
enlivens the moral message and makes his opponent’s position feel not
just wrong but shameful.
Philip Bobbitt has identified six “modalities” of constitutional
argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical.
Which modality does Justice Scalia’s opinion best reflect? It makes no
reference to the Framers or to either the original or current meaning of
any relevant constitutional language or provision. It does not draw
inferences from constitutional structures or constitutionally embedded
institutional relationships. It does refer to precedent—Dred Scott—but its
treatment of that precedent is not doctrinal in the usual sense. Justice
Scalia’s interest in Dred Scott is independent of the reasoning in Chief
Justice Taney’s opinion. It is prudential in one sense—it cares deeply about
the institutional consequences of continued Court involvement in abortion
decisions. But it is the opposite of prudential in the sense that it proposes a
“prudential” course on a priori moral rather than practical grounds.
We are left with one option within Bobbitt’s taxonomy: ethical
argument. Ethical argument captures the proposition that the preferred
result “comports with the sort of people we are and the means we have
chosen to solve political and customary constitutional problems.”164
Ethical argument is a potentially capacious category whose contours have
challenged scholars in the decades since Constitutional Fate was
written.165 Bobbitt seeks to cabin the category by arguing that the relevant
ethos that sustains ethical argument is the ethos of limited government.166
It is, at the least, awkward to characterize Justice Scalia’s position in Casey
as ethical in this sense, premised as it is on the state’s absolute freedom to
require women to bear and beget children. Indeed, in expounding the
category Bobbitt himself advances an ethical argument in favor of abortion
rights.167
One possibility is that Justice Scalia’s Casey opinion employed a
seventh modality—pathetic argument—and that this modality was either
overlooked by Bobbitt or is (as Bobbitt suggests)168 illegitimate. Bobbitt
164. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 94–95.
165. See Patrick O. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1969, 1975 (1983) (reviewing Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2) (describing
Bobbitt’s definition of ethos as appearing “almost empty”). Compare Mark Tushnet, Red,
White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 111 (1988) (distinguishing two
types of moral philosophy as “systematic moral philosophy” and “moral philosophy of
community”), with Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1233, 1287–301 (1989)
(reviewing Tushnet, supra) (vigorously disputing Tushnet’s identification of ethical
argument with moral argument).
166. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 20 (“The fundamental
American constitutional ethos is the idea of limited government, the presumption of which
holds all residual authority remains in the private sphere.”).
167. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 157–65 (proposing ethical
argument “[g]overnment may not coerce intimate acts”).
168. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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was right to resist this categorization. The original understanding of a
constitutional provision or the plain meaning of its text are legitimate
subjects of constitutional inquiry, which is to say that they wield authority
within constitutional practice; historical and textual argument are
therefore modalities inasmuch as they advance propositions with respect
to those subjects. Pathos, by contrast, is not a subject of constitutional
inquiry and is not a source of constitutional authority. This is not a
metaphysical truth, and there are domains—spousal relations, for
example—in which pathos is in fact a source of authority. But in
constitutional law, pathos is better described as a feature of constitutional
conversation, a means rather than an end. The appeal to pathos occurs not
because pathos offers information about substantive constitutional
content but because appealing to pathos helps win constitutional
arguments.169 Pathetic legal argument, then, is a mode of persuasion as to
the substance and valence of particular legal propositions: Some outcome
must be thus because deep down in your heart you know thus to be true.
Let us return to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey. This Article intimated
above that the argument type in play was not doctrinal,170 but that
conclusion was premature. A doctrinal argument asserts that some result
follows from analysis of controlling precedent. But there is more than one
way of persuading someone that that assertion is true. The most obvious
ways, at least to lawyers, are by syllogism, enthymeme, and example.171 A
syllogism is a form of deductive reasoning that infers a conclusion from
two or more premises:
“Dred Scott is wrong.” (major premise)
“Roe is like Dred Scott.” (minor premise)
“Roe is wrong.” (conclusion)
An enthymeme is a syllogism that is complete but for unspoken
assumptions:
“Roe is wrong because it is like Dred Scott.”
The major premise (“Dred Scott is wrong”) is unstated, leaving only
the minor premise (“Roe is like Dred Scott”) and the conclusion (“Roe is
wrong.”).172 Reasoning by example has an inductive rather than a
deductive logical structure:
“Dred Scott uses substantive due process.”
“Dred Scott is wrong.”
169. See Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 7 (arguing rhetoric is “partly a method
(like dialectic) with no necessary subject of its own but partly a practical art derived from
ethics and politics on the basis of its conventional uses”).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 163–164.
171. See Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2 (“Every one who effects persuasion through
proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way.”).
172. Dred Scott is sufficiently anticanonical that this particular enthymeme could
suppress both the major premise and the conclusion and still be well understood: “Roe is
like Dred Scott.”
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“Therefore cases that use substantive due process are wrong.”
Enthymeme in particular is a common feature of doctrinal argument
in federal courts, for doctrinal arguments often reason from the assumed
but unstated premise that prior Supreme Court decisions or appellate
decisions from within the deciding court’s circuit are formally binding.
A very different way of advancing a doctrinal argument is to place
significant emphasis on the opinion’s author, not because the author is
controlling authority but because the author is worthy of respect. The
Supreme Court, for example, frequently identifies opinions written by
Richard Posner even when they are majority panel opinions, a courtesy
granted few other lower court judges.173 A 2004 study analyzing citations
from 1998 to 2000 found that Judge Posner was more cited outside his
own circuit than any other appellate judge.174 Antitrust opinions written
by Robert Bork or Frank Easterbrook,175 civil procedure opinions written
by Charles Clark,176 and lower court opinions authored by judges who
later became Supreme Court Justices or who were on the Court but riding

173. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (citing CFTC
v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 701 F.2d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)); Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S.
Ct. 2652, 2675 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing In re Polis, 217 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir.
2000) (Posner, J.)); Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1803 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns
Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721–22 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.)).
174. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23, 50 (2004). This result is partly
though not entirely explained by Judge Posner’s extraordinary productivity. See id. at 54.
175. E.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (citing
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.)); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635 (1989), as authority based in part on
his “background in antitrust law”); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 338 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 564–68 (7th Cir.
1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part)). See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889, 897 (2007) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at
War with Itself (Free Press 1993) (1978)); id. at 895, 897, 905, 907 (citing Frank H.
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135 (1984)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements]; id. at 914 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Bork, supra); id. at 910, 914 (citing Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra).
176. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Dioguardi v.
Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)) (discussing Judge Clark’s ruling interpreting pleading
standards six years after publication of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of which he was a
leading drafter); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 297 (1973) (discussing Hackner v.
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941)) (citing Judge Clark’s influence in
interpreting class action rules and adoption of his interpretation by other federal courts),
superseded by statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557, 566–67
(2005).
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circuit often receive special treatment as well.177 If the first means of
doctrinal persuasion is based on logic, this means is based on character.
Finally, a judge wishing to rely on a prior precedent or doctrinally
established proposition could do so by appealing to the emotions of the
audience. It is infrequent that a judicial precedent reliably stirs emotion,
but Dred Scott is the rare opinion that has that capacity. The Court both
abided the status of slavery as a perpetual feature of American politics and
denied that black Americans ever could be U.S. citizens.178 When Justice
Scalia sought to counter the “poignant” joint opinion in Casey, he chose
carefully and well. And in evoking Dred Scott through narrative, he
distanced himself from any particular proposition or feature of Chief
Justice Taney’s opinion. The point was less to reason in conventional terms
than to set a mood.
The three modes of persuasion just described align with the three
forms of rhetoric Aristotle identified: logos, ethos, and pathos. Each form
may be used to modify a particular subject of constitutional argument.
That is, a judge may seek to persuade the audience as to the substance or
valence of arguments from history, text, structure, precedent, and
consequences through any of the three modes of persuasion. Thus,
doctrinalism as a category of constitutional argument may be further
subdivided into logical, ethical, and, as with Justice Scalia’s Casey opinion,
pathetic varieties. Each of the four other established “modalities” may also
be parsed in this way.
To illustrate the basic idea, I provide examples below of how each
mode of persuasion—logos, ethos, and pathos—may modify each of five
common types of constitutional argument: text, history, structure,
doctrine, and consequences. These argument types are approved by
Bobbitt179 and a version of each also finds favor with Richard Fallon,
whose typology of argument is frequently cited by commentators.180 The
cross-categorizations discussed below—the application of logos, pathos,
177. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1281 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (designating First Circuit opinion Hartford Fin.
Sys., Inc. v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1983), as written by Judge
Breyer)); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75–76 (1873) (citing Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3320)) (discussing decision by Justice
Washington in circuit court); id. at 97–98 (Field, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 116 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (same); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.1 (1792) (discussing circuit
court actions in three cases that together included five of six Justices of Court).
178. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857) (noting slaves were
considered “subordinate and inferior class of beings” and thus had no right to citizenship),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
179. As I discuss below, Bobbitt identifies what I have called “consequences” with
prudential argument. See infra text accompanying notes 278–281.
180. See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1194–209 (outlining five
general types of accepted constitutional argument as deriving from text, Framers’ intent,
constitutional theory, precedent, and values). Fallon refers to what this Article calls
structural argument as “constitutional theory.” Id. at 1200–02.
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and ethos to particular subjects of constitutional argument—represent
ideal types. What follows should not be taken either to suggest neat lines
of division between various categories or to suggest that those categories
do not sometimes overlap in whole or in part. It is important, however, to
conduct this exercise in some detail, as the approach to constitutional
argument it reveals is unfamiliar. Some readers will intuitively resist the
proposition, defended below, that pathetic constitutional argument stands
in parallel rather than adverse relation to its logical or ethical analogs.
1. Text. — Textual constitutional argument centers around
discovering the meaning of the words used in the Constitution. A textual
argument may consider either the historical or the contemporary meaning
of constitutional language, but original-meaning textualism overlaps
considerably with historical argument.181 Although many textualists are
formalists, textual argument need not be formalistic. A broad inquiry into
the meaning of a text may reveal its meaning to be idiomatic, colloquial, or
a term of art. The meaning of a text may also be understood at many
different levels of generality; identifying an argument as textualist does
not ipso facto commit the argument to any particular level of
abstraction.182
Persuading a listener that constitutional text has some particular
meaning may be accomplished in any number of ways. Among the most
common today are the use of contemporaneous dictionaries and reference
to usage in canonical texts such as The Federalist Papers. We will take up
The Federalist Papers and related sources in the discussion of historical
argument below. Dictionary arguments may be described either as logical
or as ethical forms of persuasion. They are logical insofar as the speaker
assumes that the dictionary will be treated as controlling the definition of
the word—as noted, it may not. Dictionary definitions are ethical insofar
as, apart from whether the dictionary definition is dispositive, a dictionary
is considered an unbiased and respected source of the definition of words.
One approach to textual argument that is more surely in the logical
mode is what Akhil Amar calls intratextualism.183 In engaging in
intratextualism, “[T]he interpreter tries to read a contested word or
phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the
Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase.”184
Thus, an intratextualist seeking to define “inferior” officers in order to
understand the scope of the President’s appointments power would look
elsewhere in the Constitution to uses of the same word—in this example,
181. Bobbitt identifies textual argument solely with contemporary definitions. See
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 25–26.
182. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 14 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Originalism]
(describing textualist approach attending to whether text describes rule, standard, or
principle).
183. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999)
[hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism].
184. Id.
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in the document’s references to “inferior” tribunals and “inferior”
courts.185 The form of argument is enthymematic: Constitutional
provision A has some particular meaning because constitutional provision
B has that meaning, on the unstated premise that the use of language is
consistent across the Constitution.
Amar uses McCulloch v. Maryland186 as one of his prime examples of
intratextualism,187 but McCulloch is also useful as a powerful example of
what we might term ethical textualism. Recall that the first question in
McCulloch was whether the federal government had the constitutional
power to incorporate a bank.188 Maryland, contesting the constitutionality
of the Bank of the United States, argued that the word “necessary” as used
in the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read restrictively, as to limit
Congress’s power to legislate to only those means that are indispensible to
its enumerated ends.189 In rebutting this argument, Chief Justice Marshall
argues, in one of the opinion’s most famous passages, that the word
“necessary” should not be so constrained:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the
welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the
intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This
could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such
narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to
the end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by
which government should, in all future time, execute its powers,
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.190
Here, the argument for a particular reading of the text follows from
the fact that “those who gave these powers” had particular aims in mind. It
does not follow directly, in the originalist sense that might simply
assimilate the meaning of the word “necessary” to the intentions of its
authors. Rather, it follows in the sense that a contrary reading would
disappoint the Founders and diminish their work: It would “give the
185. See id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress power to “constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”); id. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).
186. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
187. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 183, at 755–57 (discussing Chief Justice
Marshall’s cross-reference of Necessary and Proper Clause with use of term “absolutely
necessary” in U.S. Const. art. I, § 10).
188. The second question was whether a state had the power to tax the bank’s
operations. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425–35.
189. See id. at 413.
190. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
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Constitution ‘the properties of a legal code.’” Respect for the “character of
the instrument” therefore pushes toward a particular reading of its
language. A narrow reading is beneath the U.S. Constitution.
Pathetic argument may be textualism’s most elusive mode. Textualist
claims tend to have a positivist cast and are frequently set in opposition to
consequentialist arguments likely to engage the emotions of the American
people. At the same time, the most consistent textualists in the Court’s
history, Justice Black and Justice Scalia, are also among the Court’s most
gifted rhetoricians. It would be surprising if they could achieve that status
without ever resorting to pathetic argument, including in instances in
which the text is the subject of argument. Consider the following passage,
also from Justice Scalia’s partial dissent in Casey:
[T]he issue in these cases [is] not whether the power of a woman
to abort her unborn child is a “liberty” in the absolute sense; or
even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many women.
Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected
by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.191
Justice Scalia then explains the basis for his conclusion: Abortion is
not mentioned in the Constitution and has long been subject to prohibition
in the United States.192 But that is the second part of the argument. Justice
Scalia in fact begins his case in chief with his reference to reproductive
freedom as the “power of a woman to abort her unborn child.”193 This
phrasing implicitly likens abortion to murder, which is also a liberty
interest that does not count as one for constitutional purposes. The
argumentation works subliminally, eliciting disgust for abortion in
advance of any logical argument for including or excluding it from
constitutional protection.
2. History. — Historical constitutional argument is frequently
identified with some version of originalism, a family of theories that hold
that either constitutional meaning or the appropriate resolution of
constitutional controversies does or should proceed from the way in which
the text was originally understood or the way in which the drafters of
some operative constitutional provision would have expected the
controversy to be adjudicated. These broad qualifications of the originalist
position underscore the fact that originalism cannot easily be described as
a single theory. Previous efforts to catalog the different versions of
originalism have tended to distinguish those versions that train on the
original meaning of the Constitution’s text from those that seek guidance
in the intentions or expectations of its ratifiers or drafters,194 or else (and

191. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620
(1999).
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nonexclusively) to identify the level of generality at which the adjudicator
is to assess the meaning of constitutional text.195
Distinguishing forms of constitutional persuasion from subjects of
constitutional inquiry helps us to identify a different set of categories to
apply to argumentation grounded in constitutional history. In so doing it
helps us better to articulate both what distinguishes originalist from
nonoriginalist approaches and what distinguishes different originalist
arguments from each other.
Original-meaning originalism arose in response to two trenchant
critiques of the once-dominant original-intent formulation. First, it is
difficult, perhaps impossible, to isolate a single original intent underlying
provisions passed by multimember bodies with different perspectives,
ideologies, agendas, and degrees of forethought.196 Second, there is
significant evidence that a large number of constitutional drafters would
not have endorsed intentionalist interpretive premises, raising the
discomfiting (for intentionalists) prospect that the original intent behind
the Constitution is to disclaim original-intent interpretation.197 The force
of these criticisms was amplified by the fact that the conception of
constitutional authority underlying original-intent originalism was initially
undertheorized. Original-meaning originalism emerged as a more fully
theorized alternative. The inquiry into original meaning is said to be
appropriate because the Constitution is a written text: To the degree it is
binding at all, it is binding because that text is authoritative, and the
“meaning” of a text is logically supplied by its original meaning. The
predominant original-meaning theories are best understood, then, as
forms of logical historical argument.198 The historical inquiry is limited by
195. See, e.g., Balkin, Originalism, supra note 182, at 23–24 (articulating form of
originalism that “pays attention to the reasons why constitutional designers choose
particular types of language”); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 48–50 (1985) (arguing
level of abstraction of specificity by which we define authorial intention may determine
content of that intention).
196. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rev. 204, 213–17 (1980) (arguing that for certain provisions, amendment’s framers may
have had determinate intent, while adopters had no intent or indeterminate intent).
197. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 885, 887–88 (1985) (“As understood by its late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century proponents, the original intent relevant to constitutional discourse was not that of
the Philadelphia framers, but rather that of the parties to the constitutional compact—the
states as political entities.”).
198. Many nominally intentionalist originalists also ground their normative vision in
the status of the text as binding authority, or at least on the common assumption that the
text binds us. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning,
Original Intent, and Judicial Review xi (1999) (“[A] jurisprudence of original intent . . . seeks
to recover the textual intentions of the ratifiers in order to bring them to bear in settling
current constitutional disputes.”); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L.
Rev. 967, 969 (2004) (“[O]ne cannot interpret texts without reference to the intentions of
some author.”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
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the logic of the argument from authority that undergirds the originalmeaning theory: It includes only those sources that illuminate how a
reasonable person at the time would have understood the meaning of a
particular text.
It is unsurprising that a version of originalism that predominates
among legal scholars is in the logical mode; academic norms demand
nothing less. But academics are famously unburdened by the need to
persuade nonacademics of the validity of their ideas, and it is not at all
obvious that original-meaning originalism is the dominant mode outside of
legal academe. Nonacademic public discourse around originalism does not
tend to distinguish original meaning from original intent,199 and
originalism in the courts is variously consistent with both theories.200
Reference to the intentions and expectations of various drafters, to
statements offered at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, and to
the writings of Madison or Hamilton in The Federalist Papers are the
common stock of originalist opinions,201 and yet all of these sources more
evidently support original intent than original meaning.
Academic supporters of original-meaning originalism often defend
such references as providing examples of how reasonable or informed
people would have understood the words used in the Constitution,202 but
the practice in the courts seems to confirm the pull of intentionalist
Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703, 709 (2009) (defining “original intended meaning” as
“the meaning that textual language had for the relevant enactors”). Contrary to originalmeaning originalists, this school identifies the meaning of a text with how its authors or
ratifiers would have expected the text to be understood. To the degree that an intentionalist
grounds his theory of authority in this linguistic argument, such an individual is engaged in
logical historical argument.
199. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 688 (2009) (“[That]
original intent and original meaning are but two sides of the same interpretative coin . . . is
untrue as a matter of constitutional theory but true as a matter of constitutional politics.”).
200. Compare Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (espousing originalmeaning originalism), with id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using purposive originalism),
and with Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1683 (2012)
[hereinafter Greene, Original Intent] (noting ways originalism as practiced in courts is
consistent with original-intent theory).
201. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1685 (“The Federalist . . . [is] one of
the two main sources of the intentions of the Constitution’s drafters.”).
202. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101, 103 (1987) (“[T]he expressions
of the Framers . . . . are strong indications of what the most knowledgeable people of the
time understood the words to mean.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1133
(2003) (noting Farrand’s Records “are an excellent, first-rate resource of rich insight into
original linguistic meaning”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning,
15 Const. Comment. 529, 537 (1998) (reviewing Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (1996)) (“[T]he framers’ or ratifiers’ comments
about a particular phrase or provision are often a fairly good reflection of what that phrase
or provision commonly was understood to mean.”).
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reasoning.203 Most telling in this regard is the low opinion many
originalist judicial writings appear to have for anti-Federalists.
Discounting the views expressed by Brutus204 or The Federal Farmer205
in favor of those expressed by Publius is difficult to explain on the logic of
original-meaning originalism.206 But once we understand that historical
arguments are advanced at least as much in the ethical as in the logical
mode, it is easy to explain a preference for those who supported rather
than opposed ratification of the Constitution. Federalists, to paraphrase
Marshall, are “approved authors.”207
Conceived as an ethical mode of historical argument, original-intent
originalism is able to respond to the criticisms that gave rise to original
meaning. An adjudicator who advances an ethical historical argument has
no need to “aggregate” the intentions of multiple authors, because he selfconsciously privileges particular draftsmen.208 The intentions of the
Constitution’s authors as to the appropriate interpretive technique are,
likewise, not conclusive when the reason to refer to those intentions—the
persuasive character of the Framers—permits them to be deployed
selectively. The Framers’ technical views on interpretive method may be
less culturally salient, and therefore less available as an ethical resource,
than their views on constitutional substance. In addition, unlike dominant
203. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1690 (noting “deep reliance” on
intentionalist sources, contrasted with “shallow reliance” on original-meaning sources).
204. The writings of Brutus have been attributed to Robert Yates. See 2 The Complete
Anti-Federalist, Objections of Non-Signers of the Constitution and Major Series of Essays at
the Outset 358 (Herbert J. Storing with Murray Dry eds., 1981) (explaining arguments for
and against attribution of Brutus essays to Yates).
205. The Federal Farmer might have been Richard Henry Lee, though this has been
disputed. See id. at 103 (discussing limited contemporary source material identifying Lee as
author).
206. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1692–94 (comparing equally
credible, widely available, but largely ignored anti-Federalist sources with commonly cited
Federalist sources).
207. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819). Identifying some
originalist arguments as ethical illuminates other curious practices as well. For example, the
Supreme Court appears to prefer Federalist essays written by Madison, a former President
often described as the Father of the Constitution, to those written by Hamilton, a notorious
(and literal) bastard. See Ira C. Lupu, The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, 15 Const. Comment.
403, 410 (1998) (noting Court’s approximately equal citation of papers by Hamilton and
Madison, despite Hamilton having written twice as many). On Hamilton’s reputation and
lineage, see Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 5, 8–16 (2004) (describing Hamilton’s
temperament and backgrounds of his unmarried parents).
208. Original-intent originalists also tend, understandably on the ethical view, to
privilege historical figures, such as Washington or Jefferson, who had little or no role in
drafting the Constitution. Washington presided over the Constitutional Convention but did
not participate actively in the debates. See 6 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington,
Patriot and President, 112–13 (1975) (describing Washington’s limited role at Convention).
Though hardly an indifferent observer, Jefferson was in France during the Constitution’s
drafting and ratification. See William Howard Adams, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson
263–65 (1997) (discussing Jefferson’s views on proposed Constitution).
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versions of original-meaning originalism, a form of originalism grounded
in ethos permits reference to the original subjective expectations of the
drafters as a direct source of authority. Again, the contribution of those
expectations to the argument at issue is not in supplying the meaning of
constitutional terms or phrases but rather in drawing on the views of
heroic figures held out as specially representative of the American
constitutional tradition.
Historical argument need not be limited to some particular
foundational moment. Judicial references to “postenactment legislative
history,” sometimes criticized as bearing an uncertain relationship to
textualism or originalism,209 are not uncommon in U.S. courts.210 Such
references may address the early practices of the American people or their
leaders, as for example when nineteenth-century state or federal practice
is used to elucidate the meaning of the Establishment Clause.211 Such
references may also speak more broadly to a set of narratives we tell
ourselves about ourselves: our stable political institutions,212 our status as
a Judeo-Christian nation,213 our tolerance of dissent,214 and so forth. Thus,
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence trains not only on the original meaning of the
Constitution but also on “the longstanding traditions of American
society.”215 This kind of originalism is readily, and appropriately,
characterized as “ethical.” The traditions invoked speak most directly to
the nation’s “small c” constitution; it is as if America herself has vouched
for the propositions those traditions are meant to support.
Certain ethical claims are so deeply felt that they predictably engage
the emotions. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court held that a state could not
209. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 662 n.28 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (calling postenactment legislative history “least reliable source of authority for
ascertaining the intent of any provision’s drafters”).
210. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530–34 (1982) (citing several
pieces of postenactment legislative history in interpreting Title IX).
211. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104–06 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing nineteenth-century sources supporting narrow interpretations of Establishment
Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–91 (1983) (discussing historical practice in
interpretation of Establishment Clause).
212. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable twoparty system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective
government.”).
213. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(highlighting commonalities in historical religious practices in United States).
214. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
215. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution contains no right to
abortion. It is not to be found in the longstanding traditions of our society . . . .”).
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criminally punish someone for burning an American flag in protest.216
Chief Justice Rehnquist begins his dissenting opinion, which Justice White
and Justice O’Connor joined, as follows: “In holding this Texas statute
unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes’ familiar aphorism that
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”217 That opening is more
explicit than usual that logic is not the only mode of persuasion in
constitutional law.
The dissent proceeds to demonstrate, less through prose than verse,
the “unique position” the American flag holds as a national symbol.218
Rehnquist’s dissent quotes from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Concord Hymn,”
which envisions the colonial flag flying above the first shots of the
American Revolution;219 it excerpts generously from the lyrics of the StarSpangled Banner;220 and it recites all sixty lines of John Greenleaf
Whittier’s “Barbara Frietchie.” The poem tells the (likely apocryphal) tale
of a nonagenarian woman who waved the Union flag in the face of
Stonewall Jackson’s advancing Confederate division during the rebels’
march through Frederick, Maryland.221 Whittier takes the reader on a
journey through the lush autumn landscape of rural Maryland,
Apple- and peach-tree fruited deep,
Fair as a garden of the Lord.222
For those for whom the poem is effective, the bosom begins to swell
about here:
Forty flags with their silver stars,
Forty flags with their crimson bars,
Flapped in the morning wind: the sun
Of noon looked down, and saw not one.
Up rose old Barbara Frietchie then,
Bowed with her fourscore years and ten;
Bravest of all in Frederick town,
She took up the flag the men hauled down;
In her attic-window the staff she set,
To show that one heart was loyal yet.223
On Whittier’s telling, Frietchie’s heroism moves General Jackson
himself, who upon seeing her pick up a fallen flag, orders his men to hold
their fire:
Quick, as it fell, from the broken staff
Dame Barbara snatched the silken scarf;
216. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (concluding state’s interest in preserving symbolic value
of flag insufficient to justify criminal punishment).
217. Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 422.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 423.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 424.
223. Id.
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She leaned far out on the window-sill,
And shook it forth with a royal will.
’Shoot, if you must, this old gray head,
But spare your country’s flag,’ she said.
A shade of sadness, a blush of shame,
Over the face of the leader came;
The nobler nature within him stirred
To life at that woman’s deed and word:
‘Who touches a hair of yon gray head
Dies like a dog! March on!’ he said.224
Rehnquist’s use of the poem is not originalist in the traditional sense.
The opinion is not directed at the original meaning of the First Amendment
or the intentions of its drafters. The argument embedded within the Chief
Justice’s use of poetry is nonetheless, as he informs the reader, historical.
The opinion scans American history from a bird’s eye rather than at a
point and identifies a reverence for the flag as an idée fixe. Rehnquist then
seeks to communicate that reverence by sowing within the reader the
deep pride of patriotism. The subject matter is historical, the mode of
persuasion pathetic.
3. Structure. — Structural argument may refer to more than one
approach to constitutional interpretation. It is commonly associated with
the work of Charles Black and the series of lectures that would become the
celebrated Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law.225 Black
believed that certain constitutional outcomes followed from the
presuppositions underlying the institutional arrangements the
Constitution established. The clearest example of this genus of structural
argument is Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in McCulloch as to why
Maryland may not tax the Bank of the United States. Doing so would imply
a sovereignty of state over nation that is inconsistent with the structure of
the U.S. government and its representative institutions.226
Structural argument relates to what Fallon refers to as “constitutional
theory” argument. By this he means arguments grounded in particular
constitutional arrangements that, unlike narrow interpretivism, “claim to
understand the Constitution as a whole, or a particular provision of it, by
providing an account of the values, purposes, or political theory in light of
which the Constitution or certain elements of its language and structure
are most intelligible.”227 Fallon associates different versions of
“constitutional theory” argument with different levels of altitude from
which the interpreter assesses the relevant constitutional values or
224. Id. at 425.
225. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969).
226. See id. at 15 (“In [McCulloch], perhaps the greatest of our constitutional cases,
judgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which
we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which the
text has created.”).
227. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1200 (classifying Black’s
arguments as “middle level of theoretical argumentation”).
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purposes.228 Thus, a high-altitude theory is one that, like John Hart Ely’s
representation-reinforcement theory, specifies a particular value or set of
values underlying the constitutional structure and seeks to solve
constitutional controversies wholly or largely in light of those values. 229
Black, who identifies not one but several values embedded within the
Constitution’s structures and relationships,230 sits at a medium level of
generality.231 Purposive approaches to interpretation of specific
constitutional provisions sit at the most “particularistic” level of generality
among those approaches that Fallon includes within this category.232
As with text and history, we may additionally distinguish structural
arguments by reference to distinctive methods of persuasion. Logical
structuralism is not hard to find. For example, in INS v. Chadha, the Court
held that structural principles of bicameralism and presentment
prohibited Congress from enacting a one-house veto enabling it to
override the President’s decision to suspend deportation of an alien.233
The logic of the decision was straightforward. Major premise: Congress
has the power to make laws only through the lawmaking procedures
established in Article I. Minor premise: The decision to force deportation
of someone for whom deportation had been suspended is a legislative act;
it repeals or amends the discretionary authority previously granted to the
Attorney General.234 Conclusion: The one-house veto exercised in this case
is unconstitutional.
The flip side of Chadha’s rule is the nondelegation doctrine, which
notionally prevents excessive conferral of discretion to the Executive to
engage in fundamentally legislative activities.235 The nondelegation
doctrine is also typically justified in logical structural terms, as is the
related (and equally moribund) doctrine preventing the President from
228. See id. at 1200–02 (explaining three different levels of analysis).
229. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73–101 (1980) (identifying political
process value immanent within constitutional structure); see also David A.J. Richards,
Toleration and the Constitution 67–68 (1989) (defending theory placing respect for
individual freedom of conscience at center of constitutional interpretation).
230. See Black, supra note 225, at 11–21 (identifying values of federal supremacy, free
travel rights, and national economic unity).
231. See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1200.
232. Id. at 1201.
233. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (arguing structural constitutional constraints supersede
efficiency concerns).
234. See id. at 954 (“Congress’ decision to deport Chadha—no less than Congress’
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision,
involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way . . . .”); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution 370 n.* (2012) (presenting “two
formal proofs of the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto”).
235. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (holding
section of Clean Air Act assigning determination of national ambient air quality standards to
EPA did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–42 (1935) (finding section of National Industrial Recovery
Act permitting President to issue “codes of fair competition” unconstitutional).
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exercising lawmaking power with or without purported delegation. As
Justice Black wrote for the Court in the Steel Seizure case, the most lucid
example of this doctrine at work, “In the framework of our Constitution,
the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”236 Notably, Justice Jackson’s more
celebrated concurring opinion, though far less formalist, also exemplifies
logical structuralism. Under Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite
categorization of Presidential authority, that authority varies with the level
of congressional support not just because the opinion of Congress is
worthy of respect but because congressional authority either adds to or
subtracts from that of the President, as if the power of the political
branches were a matter of arithmetic rather than, well, power.237
Ethical structuralism is also relatively easy to find, once one knows
what to look for. This is because what Bobbitt terms ethical argument is in
many ways continuous with structural argument. Each is, Bobbitt writes in
Constitutional Interpretation, “an inferred set of arguments” that “do not
depend on the construction of any particular piece of text, but rather the
necessary relationships that can be inferred from the overall arrangement
expressed in the text.”238 As Patrick Gudridge writes, “Ethical argument,
Bobbitt seems to think, takes [Charles] Black’s approach one step further:
it generalizes ideas of structure to encompass notions of individual rights
directly.”239 The problem in trying to understand what makes ethical
argument unique is that Black was perfectly willing to extend his
arguments to cases implicating individual rights—indeed, rights cases are
among his core examples.240 To the degree, then, that we are persuaded
that the ethos underlying a particular ethical argument is embedded
within our constitutional arrangements—as with Bobbitt’s ethos of limited
government—it appears that ethical argument is structural argument, if
often at a different level of abstraction than Black’s version.
Consider Bolling v. Sharpe.241 The rule of Brown v. Board of
Education242 forbidding segregation of public schools under the Equal
236. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
237. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
238. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 20.
239. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1978; see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation,
supra note 15, at 20 (“Structural argument infers rules from the powers granted to
governments; ethical argument, by contrast, infers rules from the powers denied to
government.”).
240. See Black, supra note 225, at 8–13 (discussing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965) (striking down Texas Constitution’s provision prohibiting members of Armed Forces
who became Texas residents due to their station in Texas from voting in Texas)); id. at 15–
17 (discussing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868) (finding Nevada tax on leaving state
violated fundamental right to travel)); id. at 35–39 (discussing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment limits on federal power to states through
Fourteenth Amendment)).
241. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
242. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Protection Clause applies identically to the schools of the federally
administered District of Columbia even though the Equal Protection Clause
does not by its terms apply to the federal government. No obvious textual
argument explains this result243 but, the Court states, “In view of our
decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”244
The putative “unthinkability” of refusing to apply equal protection
principles to the federal government has come in for serious criticism.245
As Michael McConnell writes, “The decision of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment to impose its limitations only on the states, far
from being ‘unthinkable,’ reflects their understanding of the institutional
capacities of various units of government within our system.”246 Ely piles
on: “[U]nthinkable in what sense?” he asks, one page after referring to the
opinion as “gibberish.”247
Many of Bolling’s numerous critics assume its mode of persuasion to
be logical rather than ethical. It is obviously quite “thinkable” textually that
the constitutional regime with respect to individual rights would be
different for states and the federal government. The First and the
Fourteenth Amendments explicitly refer to Congress and to states,
respectively, in establishing constitutional standards for treatment of
individuals.248 Neither is it unthinkable structurally under the logic of our
federal arrangements and the Fourteenth Amendment. As McConnell
notes, various structural guarantees aim to insulate the federal
government from dominance by any particular group of interests, thereby
making it less likely that the various branches of the federal government
would combine in opposition to minorities.249 But Brown’s rejection of the
243. But see Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99
Va. L. Rev. 493, 594–98 (2013) (arguing Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause applies
certain equality guarantees against the federal government).
244. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
245. See David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia,
93 Geo. L.J. 1253, 1257–61 (2005) (collecting criticisms).
246. Michael W. McConnell, McConnell, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in What Brown
v. Board of Education Should Have Said 158, 167 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
247. Ely, supra note 229, at 32–33.
248. U.S. Const. amend. I; id. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
249. See McConnell, supra note 246, at 167 (“By virtue of [its] greater diversity, the
federal government is less likely to countenance the systematic oppression of minority
groups without our midst.”); see also The Federalist No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing advantages of large republics in mitigating effects of faction);
The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 320 (James Madison) (arguing power will be limited under
new Constitution by “contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places”). As Richard Primus has noted, since Bolling was decided, the Supreme Court
has never found that a federal statute, regulation, or practice unconstitutionally
discriminated against racial minorities. Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum. L. Rev.
975, 978 (2004). As of 2004, when Primus conducted his study, there had been only twelve
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doctrine of “separate but equal” meant not only to shift doctrine in a
formal sense but to chart the country on a new ethical course.250 Identity
between the standards limiting racial discrimination that apply to states
and the federal government was a structural reality, or so Chief Justice
Warren argued, because our ethos required it.
The third mode of persuasion and the one of greatest interest,
pathetic argument, likewise may be, and has been, applied to the
constitutional structure. The Court held in Arizona v. United States that
states are preempted from, in effect, creating their own immigration
policies that supplement federal immigration enforcement.251 Dissenting
from this holding, Justice Scalia chose to end his opinion by highlighting
the problems to which the Arizona legislature believed it was responding:
As is often the case, discussion of the dry legalities that are the
proper object of our attention suppresses the very human
realities that gave rise to the suit. Arizona bears the brunt of the
country’s illegal immigration problem. Its citizens feel
themselves under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants
who invade their property, strain their social services, and even
place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials have been unable to
remedy the problem, and indeed have recently shown that they
are unwilling to do so. Thousands of Arizona’s estimated 400,000
illegal immigrants—including not just children but men and
women under 30—are now assured immunity from enforcement,
and will be able to compete openly with Arizona citizens for
employment.252
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was almost entirely devoted to a
structural argument: that in the absence of an express congressional or
constitutional prohibition, border control is a residual and significant
element of state sovereignty.253 Most of the opinion is, broadly speaking,
in the logical mode. He cites Vattel’s treatise on the law of nations to show

reported cases in which an African American litigant had succeeded in a lower federal court
or a state court on a claim of racial discrimination brought against the federal government.
In only one such case did the decision result in invalidation of a federal statute or codified
federal regulation. See id. at 991–92 (citing Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963)).
250. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“This Nation has a
moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated
society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”).
251. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (“Arizona may have understandable frustrations
with the problems caused by illegal immigration . . . but the State may not pursue policies
that undermine federal law.”).
252. Id. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. See id. at 2511 (“As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude
persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations expressed by the Constitution or
constitutionally imposed by Congress.”).
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the original understanding of the power to exclude,254 and demonstrates
through citation to early laws and cases that immigration law remained
the province of state governments even long after ratification.255 But he
seals the deal by evoking one of our basest emotions: fear. Fear of crime,
fear of death, and, perhaps as bad in lean economic times, fear of job loss.
4. Doctrine. — Doctrinal argument is argument grounded directly in
the holdings of relevant judicial and political precedents or advanced by
reference to a purposive or justificatory theory derived from those
holdings.256 Having already discussed some of the ways in which doctrinal
argument may be subdivided into logical, ethical, and pathetic modes, I
devote little time here to further elaboration.257 It is useful, however, to
show some of the common forms of doctrinal rhetoric beyond the Roe and
Dred Scott examples.
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases provides a
ready example of logical doctrinal argument.258 The opinion of the Chief
Justice and the joint dissent in the case both argued that Congress lacks
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate “inactivity.”259 The
opinions variously offered textual, historical, structural, and prudential
arguments for that view, but they also proposed a simple doctrinal
justification: “As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They
uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible
to avoid the word when quoting them.”260 It is quite true that the regnant
formulation of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause at the time of the Health Care Cases permitted Congress to regulate
“activities,”261 and so it is perfectly logical to conclude, inductively, that
Congress may not regulate inactivity. A dissenter from this view would
argue that the Court’s references to “activities” in previous formulations
followed from the fact that activity, and not inactivity, was at issue in those
cases. But without reference to some additional, nondoctrinal argument,
254. Id. (citing Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. II, ch. VII, § 94, at 309 (Béla
Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758)).
255. Id. at 2511–13.
256. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 17–18 (“[W]hen we
say that a neutral, general principle derived from the caselaw construing the Constitution
should apply, does not apply or may apply, we make an appeal in a doctrinal mode.”); Fallon,
Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1202 (“Constitutional disputes frequently
abound with analysis of the meanings of judicial precedents.”).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 170–178.
258. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
259. Id. at 2587–89 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2649–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.).
260. Id. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (“Congress’
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.” (citations omitted)).
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that response is not sufficient to decide that Congress may regulate
inactivity under the Commerce Clause.
Ethical and pathetic doctrinalism both recur around the Court’s use of
one of its most powerful and common rhetorical devices: reference to
anticanonical cases. Anticanonical cases are those cited as examples of
constitutional law gone awry. Dred Scott,262 Plessy v. Ferguson,263 Lochner
v. New York,264 and Korematsu v. United States265 are frequently cited in
U.S. courts, but almost never in ways meant to signal agreement with their
underlying reasoning or conclusions.266 These cases often serve as
doctrinal stand-ins for deep ethical propositions. Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist framed his opposition to heightened scrutiny for commercial
speech by likening it to the Lochner era, “in which it was common practice
for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State
based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the
State to implement its considered policies.”267 The three most prominent
members of the anticanon—Dred Scott, Lochner, and Plessy—are
particularly suited to ethical doctrinalism. This is because their
anticanonicity results in part from their status as symbols of what our
canonical constitutional moments repudiated: slavery, economic due
process, and Jim Crow, respectively.268 Citing these cases signals
opposition to what the nation might have become (or once was), but is not
now.
The subject matter of these cases and the practices they blessed—
namely, forms of racial and economic subjugation—lend themselves to
deployment in pathetic doctrinal argument as well. Justice Scalia’s use of
Dred Scott in his Casey coda provides one example.269 Justice Thomas’s
references to Dred Scott and Plessy in his separate opinion in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 provide
another.270 There, concurring with a Court decision that invalidated race262. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
263. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
264. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
265. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
266. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 386 (2011) [hereinafter
Greene, Anticanon] (defining anticanon as “examples of how not to adjudicate constitutional
cases”).
267. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
268. See Greene, Anticanon, supra note 266, at 468 (“Reconstruction is the repudiation
of Dred Scott, the New Deal era a repudiation of Lochner, and the civil rights revolution a
repudiation of Plessy.”).
269. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (drawing similarity between Casey and Dred Scott
in intention to call “contending sides of national controversy to end their national division
by accepting common mandate rooted in the Constitution”).
270. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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conscious attempts to integrate the public schools of Seattle and Louisville,
Justice Thomas thus responded to the suggestion that deliberate efforts at
racial integration may be benign:
[I]f our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware
of elites bearing racial theories. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford
(“[T]hey [members of the ‘negro African race’] had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect”). Can we really be
sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy
are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but
beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to
take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow.271
Within our constitutional culture, describing pro-integration school
officials (not to mention Justice Breyer in dissent) as “elites bearing racial
theories” akin to those that found favor in Dred Scott and Plessy is an
epithet meant to provoke shame and wariness, perhaps even enmity.
Anticanonical cases are distinctive in that they stand simultaneously
for apparently inconsistent propositions.272 Plessy represents both racial
formalism and acontextual colorblindness.273 Dred Scott represents both
excessive positivism and moral activism by judges.274 Lochner represents
both the improper use of substantive due process and the use of
substantive due process at all.275 These propositions bear some logical
tension, but the ethical and pathetic valences of the decisions are less
particularized and therefore more unitary.
5. Consequences. — The category of argument I have labeled
“consequences” requires explanation and limitation. Arguing in favor of
some proposition based on consequences is obviously not particular to
constitutional law.276 It is enlightening to consider argument from
consequences in light of the Bobbitt archetype with which it is most clearly
associated: prudential argument. Bobbitt says that prudential argument is
concerned with the wisdom of permitting a particular exercise of
government power,277 but his examples suggest that the measure of
whether the decision was wise or unwise is the institutional standing of
the judiciary or the degree to which representative institutions are

271. Id. at 780–82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
272. See Greene, Anticanon, supra note 266, at 460–61 (“[A]rguments against these
cases span the ideological spectrum.”).
273. Id. at 460.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1328, 1329 (1983) (reviewing
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2) (disputing prudentialism as distinctively legal
convention).
277. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 16–17 (describing
prudential argument as introduction of “practical effects of constitutional doctrine into the
rationales underpinning doctrine”).
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permitted to function effectively.278 Prudential or consequentialist
argument thus understood speaks to a certain judicial pragmatism that
recognizes that securing the rule of law over time requires the exercise of
practical wisdom.279 Judges must attend to the “political and economic
circumstances surrounding [a] decision.”280
The general approach sketched in this Part should by now be clear
enough to proceed quickly through the examples of logical, ethical, and
pathetic prudential argument. The political question doctrine, whereby
federal courts refuse to entertain particular questions otherwise within
their jurisdiction in deference to other branches, typifies prudential
argument. The first of the factors listed in Baker v. Carr as defining a
political question is the doctrine’s logical prototype: “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department.”281 Under this prong, it is to the institutional benefit
of the judiciary to avoid wading into matters that are textually—and
therefore transparently—committed to the other branches of government.
If prudentialism can be said to have a logic, it is that the judicial
department should mind its own business.
We see ethical prudential argument in those cases, among others,
suggesting that judges should stay their hand where doing otherwise
would cause injury to some distinctively American institution. Consider,
for example, Justice Powell’s argument for the Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in which he refused to apply
heightened scrutiny to legally abetted intrastate but interdistrict wealth
disparities in primary and secondary school public education because
judicial oversight would threaten local control of schools.282 As Powell
wrote, augmenting his ethical claim by reference to an iconic judicial
figure, “Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of
our form of government each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments.’”283
For pathetic prudentialism we may look to the dissenting opinion of
Justice Scalia in Boumediene v. Bush.284 The Boumediene Court held that
Congress could not withhold the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
from enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.285 Justice Scalia
noted that the Administration chose the naval detention facility at
Guantánamo Bay in reliance on prior precedent suggesting that federal
278. See generally Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005) (defending view of
constitutional interpretation privileging democratic participation).
279. See Bickel, supra note 106, at 128 (recognizing value of judicial restraint in
political democracy).
280. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 61.
281. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
282. 411 U.S. 1, 49–51 (1973).
283. Id. at 50.
284. 553 U.S. 723, 826 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 771 (majority opinion).
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courts lacked habeas jurisdiction over foreign territory.286 His most
memorable line was both prudential and pathetic. After reminding the
reader that “America is at war with radical Islamists” and consistently
referring to the terrorist network against whom that war was waged as
“the enemy,” Justice Scalia writes:
The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon
the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.
It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. That
consequence would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a timehonored legal principle vital to our constitutional Republic. But it
is this Court’s blatant abandonment of such a principle that
produces the decision today.287
The opinion situates the Court’s actions in opposition not to “the
President” but to the “Commander in Chief” in a time of war. It is thus
prudential. It then claims that the Court has made the war “harder on us,”
placing the Court and his readership under the umbrella of the military’s
protection.288 The coup de grace, of course, is that the majority’s decision
“will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”289 Blood is on
Justice Kennedy’s hands: He should be ashamed of himself.
6. Ethos. — The table below summarizes the discussion in this Part so
far. In the left-hand column are five established modalities of
constitutional argument. The row of headers lists the three standard
modes of persuasion. Many of the examples discussed above are
represented in the resulting cross-tabulations.

TABLE 1: MODALITIES OF ARGUMENT AND MODES OF PERSUASION
Logos
Text
History
Structure

286.
287.
288.
289.

Ethos

Pathos

Intratextualism

McCulloch
definition of
“necessary”

Scalia dissent in
Casey

Original-meaning
originalism

Original-intent
originalism

Rehnquist dissent
in Texas v. Johnson

INS v. Chadha

Bolling v. Sharpe

Scalia dissent in
Arizona v. United
States

Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 827–28.
Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
Id. at 828.
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Doctrine

Activity/inactivity
distinction

Anticanon

Thomas
concurrence in
Parents Involved

Consequences

Political question
doctrine: textual
commitment

Local control of
schools in
Rodriguez

Scalia dissent in
Boumediene

Bobbitt identified and devoted much of Constitutional Fate to
elaboration of ethical argument as a sixth, distinct modality.290 On this
view, “ethos” should more appropriately be listed in the left-hand column
rather than the top row of Table 1. But remaining faithful to the
Aristotelian conception of ethos as parallel to rather than modified by
logos and pathos has some advantages over Bobbitt’s approach. Most
significantly, it substantially mitigates—or, better, explains—what
Gudridge has called the “scattershot” quality of Bobbitt’s examples of
ethical argument. 291
The metes and bounds of the category have long been obscure, even
on Bobbitt’s terms. Bobbitt has argued, for example, that the only
American ethos reflected in the Constitution is the ethos of limited
government.292 Although ethical argument itself is by now a well-accepted
form, I am aware of no scholar besides Bobbitt who accepts this curious
limitation,293 and Bobbitt’s own application of it is not transparent. For
example, as Daniel Farber notes, Bobbitt appears to include fairness to
Indians as reflecting the American ethos294 when “it is painfully obvious
that virtually nothing is as American as stealing land from Indians.”295
Apart from that fact, it is not clear how that ethic relates to limited
government; one can easily imagine ways in which either fairness or
unfairness to Indians is compelled by some conception of limited
government. “The persuasiveness of Bobbitt’s ethical arguments . . .
depends in part on the predisposition of their recipients to see the
analogies [he makes] in Bobbitt’s way,” Gudridge writes.296 It is for like
290. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 93–177.
291. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1975.
292. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 21. Bobbitt appears to
mean that the only justifiable ethical argument is one that draws on a principle of limited
government, but it is difficult to say why this is so or indeed how it meaningfully constrains
the category. See also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 144–46 (discussing
general limitations of federal government as being crux of ethical modality).
293. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Justification in Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment
on Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1707, 1716 (2004) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Justification] (noting criticism of Bobbitt’s conception of ethical arguments).
294. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 115–18 (discussing Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)).
295. Farber, supra note 276, at 1332.
296. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1976.
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reasons that Bobbitt’s treatment of this category has been called
“idiosyncratic,”297 “misleading,”298 and “seriously flawed.”299
Three examples from Constitutional Fate show how understanding
ethical argument as a mode of persuasion makes better sense of this
important category. In the Pentagon Papers Case, the Supreme Court
refused, on First Amendment grounds, to permit the President to enjoin
the publication of classified information relating to the origins and conduct
of the Vietnam War.300 This result is difficult to justify textually, since the
First Amendment does not by its terms apply to the President (or, for that
matter, to the judiciary), but Bobbitt explains the case as an application of
ethical argument: “It would be intolerable if a President could use means
to restrict a free press that Congress plainly could not . . . [b]ecause it
would be inconsistent with the ethic expressed by the First
Amendment.”301
The second example comes from Trop v. Dulles, in which the Court
held that the government could not revoke citizenship as punishment for
wartime desertion.302 The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Warren
formally justified the outcome in Eighth Amendment terms: Making
someone stateless is an unusual form of punishment and imposes a
significant disability, rendering “[h]is very existence . . . at the sufferance of
the country in which he happens to find himself.”303 Reformulating Trop in
what he describes as ethical terms, Bobbitt writes that the decision better
rests on the principle that “representative government, created by the
People acting as a whole, could not begin slicing off parts of the Polity
without the consent of the People.”304
The final example is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, which invalidated
a municipal law that prohibited extended family members from living
together in a single housing unit.305 Bobbitt characterizes as ethical the
substantive due process basis for Justice Powell’s plurality opinion, that
“‘the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’”306
The relevant ethical claims in the three opinions just discussed are the
application of free speech and press guarantees to the Executive; the
incapacity of a representative government to deconstruct its polity; and
297. Tushnet, Justification, supra note 293, at 1716.
298. Farber, supra note 276, at 1332.
299. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 665,
671 (1984) (reviewing Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2).
300. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
301. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 101–02.
302. 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
303. Id. at 101.
304. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 104.
305. 431 U.S. 494, 499–506 (1977) (plurality opinion).
306. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 96 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at
503 (1977)).
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the sanctity of the family. What binds these claims? Protection for each of
these values can be rooted in a norm of limited government, but that is
true of virtually any value derived from a case the government loses.
In fact, the points Bobbitt wishes to make in citing these cases do not
require him to articulate a sixth modality. Each fits into a more
conventional modality—just not necessarily the logical mode of that
modality. Thus, the argument that “Congress” as used in the First
Amendment is not literal is a textual argument; advancing the argument by
asserting the intolerability of the alternative within the American system
is ethical in its rhetoric. The notion that revoking citizenship without
consent is incompatible with representative government falls into the
heartland of a structural argument: It is easy to visualize Charles Black
making precisely the same moves. Again, the ipse dixit character of the
argumentation suggests an ethical cast. Finally, the idea that our history
and tradition protect the liberty to define one’s own family is clearly an
historical argument, though as with many historical arguments grounded
in ongoing traditions, it is in the ethical mode.307 What unites these cases
is less a subject of argument like the other modalities and more a mode of
persuasion with respect to distinct subjects.308
This Part has demonstrated that pathetic argument is a form of
persuasion in parallel to logical and ethical argument that may apply to
each of the traditional subjects of constitutional argument: text, history,
structure, doctrine, and consequences. This Part has not demonstrated,
nor sought to demonstrate, that pathetic argument is an appropriate
method of persuasion in any particular case or set of cases, nor has it
sought to compare it normatively with logical or ethical argument. The
next Part addresses these questions.
Significantly, this Part also has not suggested that pathetic forms of
rhetoric are used—or are appropriate—only in relation to some
identifiable and accepted subject of argument. Drawing direct connections
between rhetorical modes and subjects of constitutional argument is
useful in situating this Article’s claims within the existing literature, and
may well have normative import,309 but plainly there are instances in
which pathetic argument has been used primarily to persuade the reader
as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome, unmediated by legal niceties.
Gutwrenching statements of the facts in cases involving criminal
307. See supra text accompanying notes 209–215 (noting ethical elements of historical
arguments).
308. Describing ethical, logical, and pathetic argument as modes of persuasion
arguably aligns them with Bobbitt’s definition of his interesting term “modalities”: “the ways
in which legal propositions are characterized as true.” Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation,
supra note 15, at 12. Bobbitt’s particular interest in ethical argument, which is the closest of
his list to being a modality in precisely this sense, may bear responsibility for his
formulation.
309. See infra Part III.C.4 (criticizing use of pathetic arguments without connection to
“usual constitutional forms”).
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procedural rights provide a ready example.310 “Poor Joshua!” may provide
another.311 As the next Part discusses, if this kind of unmediated appeal to
emotion is the main target of critics of pathetic argument, then those
critics need to say more about whether and to what degree the mediated
appeals discussed in this Part should be permitted.
III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PATHOS
Is pathetic argument becoming of a constitutional judge? This Part
defends the view that it is at least sometimes appropriate for judges in
constitutional cases to seek to persuade the reader of some legal
proposition by way of an emotional appeal. This view does not depend on
the claim, discussed in Part II.A and below, that emotions always or often
embody intelligent judgments. Even if we adopt the minority position of
the feeling theorists, the place of pathetic argument as an established
element of constitutional practice and its relevance to legal persuasion
would support, if not always compel, its validity. That said, the insights of
cognitive theorists as to the structure of emotions and their relation to
judgment may nonetheless be relevant to assessing the particular
circumstances under which pathetic argument is appropriate and the
frequency with which such circumstances obtain.
Part III.A summarizes the views of cognitive theorists as relevant to
the normative case for emotional appeal in judicial opinion-writing. Part
III.B then makes that normative case. This Article argues that emotional
appeals by constitutional judges are partly constitutive of constitutional
practice, are democratically desirable in some circumstances, may
improve the administrability of constitutional rules, and are inevitable.
Part III.C discusses a set of interrelated and overlapping considerations
that, taken together, inform whether and to what degree pathetic
argument is proper within our system. These considerations include
whether the opinion is a separate writing or for the court, whether the
court itself is acting in a “law-announcing” capacity, the nature of the

310. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1994) (recounting details of
Schiro’s conviction for murder of Laura Luebbehusen; Schiro hit Luebbehusen on head
repeatedly with glass liquor bottle and iron and raped her repeatedly before and after her
death).
311. A parallel to the “Poor Joshua!” dissent may be found in Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391–96 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which
held that a criminal defendant may claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on poor
legal advice resulting in rejection of a plea bargain offer and conviction after a full and fair
trial. Id. at 1388 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia ends his dissent by personalizing the
respondent’s victim: “Released felon Anthony Cooper, who shot repeatedly and gravely
injured a woman named Kali Mundy, was tried and convicted for his crimes by a jury of his
peers, and given a punishment that Michigan’s elected representatives have deemed
appropriate. Nothing about that result is unfair or unconstitutional.” Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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particular emotion involved, and whether the emotional appeal is directed
at persuasion as to an established subject of argument.
A. The Good of Emotions
It will be difficult to arrive at a normative judgment about appeals to
emotion without first deciding what emotions are good for. Part II.A
discussed a range of views as to what constitutes emotion and
characterized the “cognitive” view as the belief that emotions are, in
important respects, subjective judgments attached to some intentional
object. If emotions operate in parallel to other cognitive processes that
help us to evaluate and to assess propositions about our environment,
then it may well shift the burden to those who would claim that pathetic
argument is never an appropriate rhetorical strategy for a constitutional
judge. It is beyond this Article’s scope to defend the cognitive view in full,
but it is worth exploring how much accepting this view would help to
answer the normative question that sits at the heart of this Part.
A simple example from the law of evidence is instructive. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and in most state courts, an “excited utterance”
is an exception to the general prohibition on hearsay.312 The Federal Rules
define an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
that it caused.”313 The idea is that a spontaneous statement made within
the anxiety or excitement of the moment, before any opportunity for
reflection, is less likely to have been fabricated.314 The exception is
therefore consistent with a common Freudian intuition that raw emotions
can reveal our true views about the world, and, conversely, that logical
reasoning can abide manipulation and obfuscation.315 At the same time,
criticism of the excited utterance exception foregrounds the complexity of
the relationship between emotions and truth claims.316 Excited utterances
are considered reliable because they more or less accurately report the
312. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992)
(declaring excited utterance exception to be “firmly rooted” and recognized in “nearly fourfifths” of states). Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its progeny, excited
utterances may be introduced as hearsay in a criminal case if—as will often be the case—
they were made in the course of an “ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
826–28 (2006); see also Andrew Dylan, Note, Working Through the Confrontation Clause
After Davis v. Washington, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1905, 1932 (2007) (“Davis’s ongoing
emergency test tends to flatten the distinction between confrontation analysis and hearsay
analysis under the excited utterance exception.”).
313. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
314. 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1747, at 195 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1976) (explaining traditional rationale for spontaneous exclamation
exception).
315. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 643 (discussing excited utterance exception).
316. See Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 159, 178–83 (1997) (presenting
psychological critique of excited utterance exception).
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speaker’s perceptions, not because they nudge those perceptions any
closer to reality. Judgments made in haste or in moments of stress, shock,
or euphoria may be less likely to be deliberately mendacious, but they may
be more susceptible to cognitive breakdowns that impair perception.317
Cognitivists have lent both theoretical and empirical support for the
view that emotions function in just the way the excited utterance
exception contemplates. Dan Kahan describes three different models of
how emotions function in risk perception,318 which is crucial to forming
judgments about legal rules. On one model, the “rational weigher theory,”
emotions are the psycho-physical expression of risk perceptions arrived at
through a rational balancing of costs and benefits.319 On a competing
model, the “irrational weigher theory,” emotions act as heuristics to
compensate for our inability to rationally assess costs and benefits. As
crude substitutes for balanced assessments, they systematically impair our
judgments and lead to identifiable biases in our perception of risk.320 On a
third model, the “cultural evaluator theory,” rather than helping us to
maximize our welfare in a narrow sense, emotion helps to align our
judgments with the social meaning of particular activities.321 An
individual’s aim on this view is to make judgments consistent with a world
that expresses her core beliefs. Emotions are an important conduit
between those core beliefs and states of affairs that conform to or resist
them.
There is considerable evidence that emotion indeed precedes and
motivates assessments of value. It has been observed, for example, that
individual perceptions of risk tend to vary inversely with individual
perceptions of benefit.322 This negative correlation requires explanation,
since risk bears no necessary relationship to benefit (and to the degree
that it is related, we might expect the relationship to be positive). One
plausible explanation is that our initial reaction to some propositions is an
affective reaction that jointly informs our assessment of risks and
benefits.323 Consistent with this hypothesis, a 1994 study by Ali Alhakami
and Paul Slovic found that the quantified intensity of individuals’ affective
evaluations of particular phenomena, such as nuclear power or bicycles,
317. See id. at 181 (“[B]ut the very stress that makes them so honest can also interfere
with their ability to perceive, transcribe, and remember events.”).
318. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev.
741, 744–52 (2008).
319. Id. at 745–46.
320. Id. at 746–48.
321. Id. at 748–49.
322. See Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1085
(1994) (presenting studies depicting inverse relationship between risk perception and
benefit perception).
323. See id. (“We find that the inverse relationship is . . . indicative of a confounding of
risk and benefit in people’s minds.”).
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were strong predictors of the degree of negative correlation between
perceived risk and perceived benefit.324 That is, strongly held feelings
about an object or activity led people to judge the object or activity as
either high risk and low benefit (with unfavorable attitudes as the
independent variable) or low risk and high benefit (with favorable
attitudes as the independent variable).325 Additional experimental
research has found that time pressure, which tends to diminish the
opportunity for nonaffective forms of cognition, increases the magnitude
of the negative correlation between risk and benefit.326 This and similar
studies have led many researchers to conclude that affect “comes prior to,
and directs, judgments of risk and benefit.”327
Emotions help us connect our external environment to our values.
Nussbaum uses a helpful example that originates with the neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio.328 “Elliot” was a man in his thirties with damage to his
prefrontal cortex that required surgery.329 Elliot had no difficulty
performing a very wide range of cognitive tasks, such as remembering
dates, names, and other details of his personal and professional life as well
as being capable of high-level discussion of macro issues such as politics
and the economy.330 But he lost all sense of responsibility. He could not
motivate himself to get up in the morning, he could not be trusted to
manage his tasks at work, his attention span was sporadic and
unpredictable, and his judgment of character seemed to suffer.331 Elliot
was intelligent and otherwise healthy but, Damasio writes, he was “unable
to reason and decide in ways conducive to the maintenance and
betterment of himself and his family, no longer capable of succeeding as an
independent being.”332
Follow-up revealed that Elliot had another problem: He could not
emote. With an unusually acute memory for detail, he related tragic
personal events with complete detachment.333 Topics of conversation that
had once affected him deeply no longer caused any emotional reaction in

324. See id. at 1095 (“A person’s general affective evaluation of the item was the major
predictor of the risk/benefit correlation.”).
325. Id.
326. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk and
Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1, 6–7 (2000); cf. Richard S. Lazarus, Emotion and
Adaptation 131 (1991) (presenting data establishing increased negative correlation
between risk and benefit).
327. Finucane, supra note 326, at 3.
328. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 116 (discussing Damasio’s patient
“Elliot”); see also Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain 36–37 (1994) (introducing patient with damage to prefrontal cortex).
329. Damasio, supra note 328, at 34–35.
330. Id. at 35.
331. Id. at 36–37.
332. Id. at 38.
333. Id. at 44–45.
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any direction.334 Additional study of other patients with prefrontal
damage similar to Elliot’s found each of them to have both defective
decisionmaking ability and “flat” emotion.335 These cases then led to
further research that revealed multiple sections of the brain the
impairment of which simultaneously hinders “goal-oriented thinking” and
“emotion and feeling.”336 These findings lend significant plausibility to
Nussbaum’s conclusion, drawing on the work of Damasio and others, that
“emotions provide the animal (in this case human) with a sense of how the
world relates to its own set of goals and projects.”337
Maroney usefully summarizes the ascendant cognitivist conclusions
as to the utility of emotions.338 She writes that emotion “reveals reasons,
motivates action in service of reasons, enables reason, and is educable.”339
Emotions are evaluative, in some way, and reflect beliefs that are not just
ministerial reactions to stimuli but can be normatively evaluated, can be
taught,340 and should be judged rational or irrational piecemeal rather
than on the whole. But emotions enable particular kinds of evaluations:
They are assessments of value, and therefore motivate judgment,
prioritization, and consequently action in a way that, as poor Elliot
teaches, nonaffective cognition cannot.341
B. The Good of Pathetic Argument
Who is a constitutional judge’s ideal reader?342 Surely it is not Elliot,
but why not? Answering this question seems to require a theory of what
constitutional law is and what it aspires to be. The excited utterance
example suggested that the reliability of an emotion-laden judgment
depends on the nature of the claim under evaluation. Emotion may enable
that judgment to better resonate with our core values even as it biases our
evaluation of historical or empirical facts. The intelligence of an emotional
judgment, in other words, depends on what the decider’s ends are. But to
334. Id. at 45.
335. See id. at 54–58 (discussing historical cases from 1932, 1940, and 1948 of
patients exhibiting symptoms similar to those of Elliot).
336. See id. at 70 (“[T]here appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain
consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and . . . also
involved in emotion and feeling . . . .”).
337. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 117.
338. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 642–51 (discussing roles of emotion and reason in
law).
339. Id. at 642.
340. See id. at 648 n.96 (citing James J. Gross & Ross A. Thompson, Emotional
Regulation: Conceptual Foundations in Handbook of Emotional Regulation 3, 13–15 (James J.
Gross ed., 2007), as overview of “cognitive change” strategy for altering emotions).
341. Cf. Hume, supra note 130, at 236 (“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the
passions . . . .”).
342. See White, Heracles’ Bow, supra note 12, at 96–99 (exploring interpretation of
“meaning” based on how document’s ideal reader would understand its bearing on present
cultural and political circumstances).
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assume that the object of constitutional judging is to prove some positive
proposition rather than to align the law with the values of the governed is
to beg the question.
This Section offers four normative justifications for the use of pathetic
argument in constitutional law. These justifications proceed from different
assumptions about what constitutional law ought to be. All four
justifications support the view that pathetic argument is not always
appropriate, but that whether it is or is not better aligns with how
emotional appeals are made than with whether they are made at all.
1. Pathetic Argument as Conventional. — Pathetic argument may be
appropriate to the degree that it constitutes a standard move in
constitutional law. Constitutional law, like politics, is beset with
reasonable disagreement over the outcomes it supports.343 In deciding
whether some approach to constitutional law is appropriate, it will not
generally be helpful to assess the results that approach produces, since
doing so simply reproduces intractable disagreement.344 The more useful
way to evaluate a constitutional method is by reference to its consistency
with accepted practices of constitutional decisionmaking.345 An approach
is properly “constitutional” if it fits the usual grammar of constitutional
law.346 Part II.B showed that this was true with respect to at least some
forms of pathetic argument at least some of the time.
Concededly, the notion that pathetic argument is appropriate because
it is used has a certain just-so quality. Note, however, that all of the
pathetic examples from Part II.B are from cases decided in the last three
decades. This is not to say that pathetic argument was never used before
then, but it does suggest the possibility that the pathetic mode was less
common before the advent of modern substantive due process and before
the rise of legal realism.347 Substantive due process has invited
343. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J.
1346, 1366–69 (2006) (arguing consensus about constitutionally protected rights is not
exempt from general disagreement about major political issues).
344. Looking to results may be helpful on the margins, as for example when some
approach calls into question the validity of canonical cases or the invalidity of anticanonical
ones. See Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal Education, 43 J. Legal Educ. 22, 26 (1993)
(“[A]n approach to constitutional interpretation is unacceptable if it entails the
incorrectness of Brown v. Board of Education.”).
345. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 582–84 (2001) (arguing extent to which
practice is embedded provides support for its constitutionality).
346. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771,
1775 (1994) (discussing importance of “law talk” in legitimate constitutional arguments);
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal
Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 689 (1985) (suggesting law be defined as “particular set of
resources made available by a culture for speech and argument”).
347. See generally Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 193 (2002) (cataloguing differences in
rhetoric between Stone and Rehnquist Courts).
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constitutional judges to inquire into, variously, values “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,”348 “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,”349 and choices that enable one to “define one’s own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”350 Legal realism dispelled the notion that law, and especially
constitutional law, could be reduced to a mechanistic formula insensitive
to the biases and predilections of the decider. Established modalities of
argument rise and fall in prominence in ways that feed back into the
degree to which their use is acceptable. Imagine, if you can, District of
Columbia v. Heller351 being written in 1978 instead of 2008. Mainstream
constitutional thinkers would instinctively have coded both its pro-gun
result and its unapologetically originalist methodology—the myopic focus
on history as a subject of constitutional discourse—as wrong.352 Things
change. There is no reason to believe that modes of constitutional
persuasion are any less susceptible to these dynamics than subjects of
constitutional argument.
2. Pathetic Argument as Democratic. — Pathetic argument is valuable
because of its power to persuade. In politics, we expect leaders to
persuade the electorate that the policies they are pursuing are in line with
the polity’s values. If emotion is necessary to forming those kinds of
judgments, as evidence suggests,353 then pathetic argument is both
desirable and essential to politics.354 Constitutional law aspires to be
different from politics—or at least to be different from electoral politics—
but we must ask whether the dimension of difference either requires or
suggests a different attitude toward appeals to emotion.355
Imagine you get a speeding ticket—eighty miles per hour in a sixtyfive mile per hour zone—and are required to appear before a judge. You
plead guilty and the judge requires you to pay a fine. Before letting you go,
348. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
349. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
350. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
351. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
352. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 223–24 (2008) (discussing skeptical view of individual rightsbased Second Amendment arguments in 1980s).
353. See supra Part III.A (summarizing views of cognitive theorists with respect to
relationship between emotions and assessments of value).
354. See Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of
the Nation 55–57 (2008) (discussing role of emotional reactions in politics); see also Dan T.
Coenen, The Story of The Federalist: How Hamilton and Madison Reconceived America 47–
50 (2007) (cataloguing appeals to emotion appearing in The Federalist Papers).
355. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 636 (remarking, in Enlightenment thinking, “[s]ome
quantum of emotion . . . was to be expected from legislative and executive officials” but not
judges).
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the judge chastises you in open court for engaging in dangerous behavior.
He points to your young son playing with a toy truck in the back of the
courtroom and says, “Some little boy just like him is alive today only
because you were lucky enough not to blow out a tire at the wrong time.”
The judge has made a pathetic appeal for you not to drive so fast. He
assumes that you value the life of your child and he believes that your
experience of shame, guilt, or sadness will help to connect your behavior
to your values. The feelings the judge seeks to invoke may well perform
that function much better than a monetary fine. But that kind of appeal
would feel out of place in a judicial opinion. The appeal is for your ears—
only in part because we recognize the subjectivity of emotion. We all have
different values, as much as we all have different personal memories,
experiences, and perceptive capacities. That our emotional response to
some object can be expected to differ from our neighbor’s is part of what
constitutes the response as an emotion rather than some other cognitive
process.356 Pathetic arguments are, in Bobbitt’s phrase, “idiosyncratic”
because emotions are themselves idiosyncratic.
But constitutional law is not like traffic tickets. The speed limit is
verifiable and typically transparent, its status as a governing rule is not
usually questioned, and whether a driver has surpassed it is a question of
physics rather than metaphysics. Constitutional law (in hard cases, at
least)357 requires a judge to persuade a reader that conduct that some
political actor often believed efficacious and legal violated (or did not
violate) a rule or (more often) standard or principle whose authority
derives from some combination of inertia, general acceptance by the
American people, historical provenance, or social desirability. And so the
feat of persuasion is not simply to have the reader internalize the social
policy embedded in an agreed-upon rule; it is to have the reader accept the
applicability and authority of the rule itself.358 This task is not only more
difficult but it is necessarily “idiosyncratic.” In the absence of any accepted
metarule that prioritizes different sources of constitutional meaning,359
the practice of constitutional law is the practice of persuading diverse
citizens to share the priorities of the adjudicator.360 To the degree that
356. See Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 27–28 (discussing subjective nature
of perception and emotional responses).
357. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 764–73 (2013)
(arguing legal realist challenge extends to cases appearing easy on basis of formal legal
materials).
358. Cf. Robert A. Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric and Ulysses in Government Hands, 15
Rhetoric & Pub. Aff. 435, 439 (2012) [hereinafter Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric] (“[T]he more
controversial the decision, and the more uncertain the consequences, the greater the need
for [judicial] commentary that reaches outward while answering an inward matter.”).
359. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 155–62 (discussing
lack of usefulness of such metarule if one did exist).
360. Among the diverse citizens, of course, are the parties before the court. See
Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric, supra note 358, at 437 (“The need for persuasion is more
intense in a judicial opinion [than in ordinary discourse], because the multiple ‘hearer’ in
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emotions are vital to one’s capacity to set priorities in light of one’s values,
emotional appeals must form part of constitutional practice.
This justification for pathetic argument is ultimately democratic.
Persuading the audience that an argument is properly constitutional
requires the judge to persuade the audience that it is consistent with or
compelled by their values. Failing to do so does not necessarily deprive the
rule the argument supports of the force of law (hence the
countermajoritarian difficulty) but it may deprive it of democratic
justification. Alexander Bickel may have put the point best, if unwittingly.
Bickel emphasized that the countermajoritarian difficulty is misleading if
we understand judges to be custodians of our long-term values:
[M]any actions of government have two aspects: their immediate,
necessarily intended, practical effects, and their perhaps
unintended or unappreciated bearing on values we hold to have
more general and permanent interest. . . . [W]hen the pressure
for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high
enough, [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency
rather than take the long view. . . . Judges have, or should have,
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of
the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in
sorting out the enduring values of a society . . . . [Courts can]
appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations . . .
.361
This reads like a brief for the position that judges should avoid emotional
appeal, until we remember Elliot. Emotional impairment seemed to
prevent Elliot from connecting his everyday judgments to his aspirations.
Stephen Holmes writes, echoing Bickel, that “[a] constitution is Peter sober
while the electorate is Peter drunk,”362 but Damasio’s description of Elliot
calls to mind a different but equally resonant sort of inebriate—listless,
distracted, unable to rouse himself to action. The revolution must be equal
parts Enjolras and Combeferre,363 as moved by passion as grounded in
reason.364

court is formally divided with at least one reluctant auditor and probably more in the
disappointed party.”).
361. Bickel, supra note 106, at 24–26.
362. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy
135 (1995).
363. Victor Hugo writes that Enjolras “was subject to unexpected outbursts of soul,”
whereas Combeferre preferred “to bring the human race into accord with its destiny
gradually, by means of education, the inculcation of axioms, the promulgation of positive
laws; and, between two lights, his preference was rather for illumination than for
conflagration.” 3 Victor Hugo, Les Misérables bk. 4, at 68–69 (Isabel F. Hapgood trans., New
York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1887) (1862).
364. See Abrams, Emotions, supra note 66, at 570–71 (“[T]he mobilization of rights is
informed and infused by varied forms of affect . . . .”). This capacity can be pernicious, and
not just in the obvious ways that revolutionary France calls to mind. See infra Part IV.B
(recognizing potential for appeals to emotion to stoke regressive forms of populism). It may
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Pathetic argument may have still greater democratic justification
insofar as we understand constitutional law in expressive terms.365 Much
constitutional doctrine derives from the social meaning of particular
governmental practices, such as racial discrimination or religious
endorsement.366 The Constitution’s text and history may be indeterminate
as to whether, for example, the Constitution permits racial
gerrymandering, the specific harm of which is difficult to articulate or
measure,367 but Shaw v. Reno368 and its progeny recognize that racial
gerrymanders that create bizarrely shaped districts upset expectations
about political community in the name of a single value—race—whose
relationship to representative politics is itself contested and complex.369
Certain kinds of violations are of the “we know it when we see it” sort
precisely because law interacts with social reality in a way that is
impossible either to quantify or to ignore. The judgment that certain
practices are unconstitutional is not intelligible unless the adjudicator
appreciates the values the practice communicates and ties them to her
own. Denying the pathetic mode to constitutional judges therefore disables
them in seeking public approval and understanding of their work.
It may do even more. This Part has assumed that emotional appeal
enables persuasion, and that its capacity to do so may recommend it, in
some cases, whether or not emotion also enables rational judgment in the
traditional sense. But recall that emotion may also be necessary to basic
cognition, and so emotional appeal may be necessary to explanation of
constitutional law. Accepting this claim requires accepting at least some
cognitivist premises about the basic ontology of emotion, but crucially it
does not presuppose any indeterminacy in constitutional law. Many

also undermine the persuasiveness of the opinion if used too clumsily, as perhaps with
“Poor Joshua!” and with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s flag-burning opinion.
365. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1504–05, 1531–64 (2000) (arguing “existing
practices of moral and legal evaluation are best understood through expressivist
perspectives” and constitutional doctrine is best understood through conceptions of
expressive dimensions of state action).
366. See id. at 1532 (noting Equal Protection Clause and Establishment Clause are
“areas scholars most often point to as best understood in expressivist terms”).
367. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 483, 499–506 (1993) (contending Shaw teaches modes of constitutional analysis
extending beyond analysis of policy purpose and effect, and “value reductionism”).
368. 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding unconstitutional instances where newly drawn
district is “so extremely [geographically] irregular on its face” as to be understood only as
“effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting”).
369. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 365, at 1539 (attributing expressive harm of
racial redistricting to improper association of political identity and race); Pildes & Niemi,
supra note 367, at 526 (observing Shaw v. Reno illustrates government cannot
constitutionally redistrict such that race supplants other relevant values).
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familiar tools of exposition—metaphor,370 personalization of abstract
concepts,371 slippery slope arguments372—are most powerful when they
engage the emotions, if only to ensure that a complex or obscure point is
understood.373
3. Pathetic Argument as Administrable. — In December 1997, Shirley
Ree Smith was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison for
shaking her seven-week-old grandson too violently while putting him to
sleep.374 The evidence that the child died of so-called Shaken Baby
Syndrome rather than Sudden Infant Death Syndrome was heavily
disputed at trial.375 Her conviction was affirmed on appeal and she failed
to obtain postconviction relief in state courts.376 A federal district court
denied her petition for writ of habeas corpus, but the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered that the writ be granted on the
basis of insufficient evidence.377
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded
without argument for reconsideration in light of Carey v. Musladin.378
Musladin had to do with neither Shaken Baby Syndrome nor the sufficiency
of the evidence standard. In Musladin, a panel of the Ninth Circuit had
reversed a district court’s denial of habeas relief on the issue of whether it
violated a murder defendant’s fair trial rights to allow members of the
victim’s family to wear buttons depicting the victim in the front row of the
gallery.379 What the two cases principally had in common was an alleged
misapplication by a Ninth Circuit panel of the standard for granting habeas
relief codified in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.380
The Ninth Circuit either did not get the message or ignored it. On
remand, the panel reinstated the grant of habeas relief, concluding that its
370. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] chill wind blows.”).
371. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1949–50 (2011) (embedding
photographs of overcrowded conditions in California prisons in opinion holding
substandard medical treatment resulting from conditions violated Eighth Amendment).
372. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (arguing government’s position in favor of upholding mandate to purchase
health insurance would likewise permit mandate to purchase “cars or broccoli”).
373. If one accepts the claim that emotion invariably influences judicial
decisionmaking—a premise this Article does not endeavor to defend—then appealing to the
reader’s emotion might perform an additional democratic service: candor.
374. Andrew Blankstein, Woman Convicted in Grandson’s Shaking Death, L.A. Times
(Dec. 9, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/09/local/me-62263 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
sub nom. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007).
375. Smith, 437 F.3d at 886–88.
376. Id. at 888.
377. Id. at 890.
378. Patrick, 550 U.S. 915 (2007); see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
379. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 73 (discussing procedural history of case).
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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earlier decision was “unaffected by Musladin.”381 The State again
petitioned for certiorari. Again the Court granted the petition and vacated
and remanded in light of another case, McDaniel v. Brown,382 in which the
Ninth Circuit had been reversed on a grant of habeas relief. On remand, the
panel again reinstated its original opinion, concluding that “nothing in
Brown is inconsistent with our prior decision or our method of reaching
it.”383 The State once more petitioned for certiorari, and this time the
Supreme Court summarily reversed with a written opinion.384
I recite this sequence to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s
audience is not limited to the American people and that other actors
within the federal system have the capacity to resist the Court’s
directives.385 The Court sits atop a pyramid of lower federal courts and,
with respect to issues of federal law, formally controls the decisions of the
state courts. Supreme Court decisions also must be enforced by executive
officials, must be followed by administrative agencies in the course of
rulemaking and enforcement activity, and must be honored by legislative
drafters across the country. As with any appellate court, the Supreme
Court’s efforts at persuasion must attend to the many different
decisionmakers who must implement and negotiate its decisions.386 In a
setting of radical institutional pluralism, failure to persuade may have
powerful consequences for the administration of judicial doctrine.387
381. Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007).
382. 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010).
383. Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2010).
384. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7–8 (2011) (holding evidence sufficient to
support finding child died from Shaken Baby Syndrome). California Governor Jerry Brown
subsequently granted Smith executive clemency. Carol J. Williams, Woman Won’t Be Sent
Back to Prison, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 2012, at AA1.
385. See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in
a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 457, 459–62, 472–74, 477–81 (2012)
(discussing how discretionary space in constitutional interpretation allows for “occasional
departures from the Supreme Court’s desired course of action” by lower courts); Gudridge,
supra note 165, at 1986–89 (discussing lower courts’ resistance to Supreme Court rulings
and initiation of development of new areas of constitutional law). See generally Adam
Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 601, 609–11, 630–46 (2013) (describing methods by which public officials may resist
implementing laws, including defiance, nonacquiescence, bulletproofing, outsourcing,
prioritization, and interpretation).
386. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va. L. Rev.
1545, 1561 (1990) (“Like the lawyer-advocate, the judge has a number of audiences she
must persuade that she is right and that the losing party’s lawyer is wrong. These audiences
include the appellate courts, the legal community, the losing party . . . , and the public at
large.”).
387. See Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 673, 690, 692 (1994) (concluding judges on courts of appeals were “relatively
faithful agents” of their Supreme Court principal but their responsiveness to Court “did not
prevent entirely the judges on the courts of appeals from pursuing their own policy
preferences”).
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None of this is to say that attention to pathetic argument would have
reined in the Ninth Circuit in the shaken baby case. But eschewing an
otherwise effective mode of persuasion complicates the Court’s task as a
principal. The “cultural script of judicial dispassion”388 encouraged the
Court to ignore the expressive dimension of the case, which involved
attaching the enormous social meaning of a potential life term in prison to
the case of a grandmother who was trying to put her infant grandson to
sleep.389 The Ninth Circuit panel was quite plausibly affected by this
dimension but was never engaged on its terms.
4. Pathetic Argument as Inevitable. — In the end, the best normative
case for treating some pathetic arguments as appropriate may simply
derive from the inevitability of their deployment. This is not, in the main, a
fatalistic argument that simply gives up on the capacity of human judges to
perform their jobs professionally. It is, rather, a second-best argument that
proceeds from the assumption (which I do not hold) that emotional appeal
would be absent in an ideal world. When an ideal world is unattainable, we
should ask ourselves how to make the best of its alternative. And the way
to make the best of a world in which constitutional judges sometimes
advance pathetic arguments is to develop and support a set of best
pathetic practices. Treating emotional appeals as forbidden allows them to
proceed when unnoticed—as when judges embellish the facts in capital
appeals or augment their own authority by treating legal texts as having
obvious meanings390—but not when such appeals are transparent, as in
“Poor Joshua!” As Part III.C discusses below, that pattern does not likely
map on to the contexts in which pathetic argument is most easily justified.
C. When to Be Pathetic
The reasons why pathetic arguments are sometimes appropriate in
constitutional law inform the related question of when such arguments are
appropriate. If convention partly dictates the answer to the normative
question, it might tell us still more about the contexts in which judges tend
to make emotional appeals. If democratic considerations particular to the
nature of constitutional law make pathetic argument necessary to
constitutional practice, then we will want to attend to the particular
conditions under which emotional engagement improves democratic
reflection over the subjects of constitutional cases. Constitutional practice,
constitutional law, the scope and substance of emotions as an experiential
category, and the definition of an “appeal” to emotion are sufficiently
complex that we can safely assume that the normative question is not
388. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 629.
389. See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 25, at 605–30 (discussing social
meanings connotatively expressed through various forms of punishment).
390. See James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 835, 849–57 (1986)
(identifying this latter move in Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
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binary. It is unlikely to be obvious in any given case whether an emotional
appeal is in bounds or out, just as it is often unclear whether some deep
political argument is “constitutional,” or whether a feeling or mood is an
“emotion.”
That said, this Part proposes four overlapping considerations that, in
combination, are relevant to assessing when pathetic arguments are
appropriate in opinion-writing by constitutional judges. A fifth
consideration—the subtlety of the appeal—is worth mentioning here only
so that its relevance may be appropriately qualified. In many instances, a
pathetic appeal is more likely to succeed if it is not obvious. If an opinionwriter is to derive good practices from convention, which suggests
ambivalence toward emotional appeals, he must not ignore the perils of
the overwrought opinion. But subtlety is surely not the only consideration,
and it is difficult to derive criteria—independent of subtlety’s capacity to
persuade in any particular case—that help us to assess its appropriate use
more generally. Further, as the considerations below suggest, the insights
derived from convention are not the only ones relevant to the normative
question.
1. Separate Writings. — First, we should care whether the putative
pathetic argument appears as part of an opinion of a court or whether it is
part of a separate writing. Pathetic arguments are more likely to be
appropriate in the latter instance. The reason is partly a matter of
convention: Pathetic arguments are more common in separate opinions. A
certain kind of formalism (some would say “sophistry”391 or “legalistic
argle-bargle”392) has survived both legal realism and critical legal studies;
its resilience may reflect popular preference as much as inertia,393 and so
pathetic argument may simply be less persuasive when an opinion
purports to declare the law.394 But there are also sound theoretical
reasons for giving greater latitude to concurrences and dissents. An
opinion that does not speak for the court is typically urging law reform,
either addressed to colleagues on the bench or addressed to members of
the political branches. It is uncontroversial, or should be, that law creation
by political bodies does and should attend at least in part to pathos.395 As
discussed, it is more controversial that judge-made law should adopt a
391. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
392. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
393. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling
Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 416 (2011) (noting Americans’ affinity toward “rule of
law” values).
394. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing consideration of law declaration in pathetic
argument).
395. See supra text accompanying note 94 (opining on impropriety of judicial use of
pathetic argument); see also Westen, supra note 354, at 117–24 (explaining link between
emotion and voting behavior); Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain,
Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. Am. Hist. 463,
475–87 (1995) (describing vivid emotional appeals by American abolitionists).
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similar focus, but separate opinions in constitutional cases often
emphasize dimensions of the problem neglected or glossed over by the
court majority. Once it is conceded that pathetic arguments are part of the
judge’s toolkit, it must also be conceded that it is at least permissible for a
separate writing to encourage their use in a particular case. For like
reasons, pathetic arguments are more likely to be appropriate when
advanced by litigants or other legal advocates than when advanced by
judges.396
2. Law Declaration. — A second significant and related consideration
is whether the court’s work is best described as “law-announcing” or “lawapplying.” As between the two, pathetic argument is generally more
appropriate in opinions written by law-announcing bodies or actors in
contexts that call for, as Henry Monaghan puts it, “law declaration” rather
than “dispute resolution.”397 When a court declares the law, its concern is
with concretizing previously indeterminate legal rules or standards and its
gaze is fixed on the future rather than the past. Dispute resolution is
focused on historical rather than legislative facts, on the particular parties
before the court, and on whether the defendant’s conduct violated a wellestablished rule of law.398 No bright line separates these categories at the
margins but it remains a useful distinction, particularly at the Supreme
Court. The Court understands itself to be concerned primarily with law
declaration, as evidenced by its shrinking docket and its codified standard
for granting certiorari: Rule 10 states that “[a] petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”399
This dichotomy finds a loose parallel in Aristotle’s distinction
between “deliberative” and “judicial” or “forensic” rhetoric.400
Deliberative rhetoric is addressed to one who is adjudicating “future
happenings” such as “[a] member of a democratic assembly,” whereas
judicial rhetoric is addressed to one who is “judging the past,” such as a
member of a jury.401 Our general unease in conceding that judges make
law is grounded in the reality that legitimate construction of legal rules
and standards requires a careful weighing of competing societal values. A
judge cannot easily perform this task without making those values
intelligible through emotional engagement. The notion that a judge might
396. See supra text accompanying notes 74–87 (describing pathetic argument’s role in
trial advocacy).
397. Monaghan, supra note 20, at 668.
398. This distinction may overlap with, but does not neatly track, the distinction
between facial and as-applied challenges. The Court’s skepticism about entertaining facial
challenges reflects a reluctance to decide cases not before it, but an as-applied challenge on
which certiorari is granted may well involve deep uncertainty as to the content of the
applicable constitutional rule.
399. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
400. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 3, §§ 3–4.
401. Id. § 2.
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make constitutional law is even more unsettling, since his decision
displaces the democratically enacted laws of the community and the
democratically accountable actions of its leaders. As Marie Failinger
writes, the work of the Supreme Court, in particular, “ranges beyond the
forensic, to deliberative and epideictic tasks necessary in the creation of an
ongoing constitutional community of trust.”402 Some constitutional
doctrines invite this kind of value-balancing more than others; consider,
for example, the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry in the Eighth
Amendment context,403 or the “shocks the conscience” standard for a due
process violation.404
A court that understands itself to be applying established legal rules
to a common fact situation need not make a judgment nor solicit the
audience’s judgment as to the values underlying the law or the interplay
between those values and the particular circumstances of the accused. The
relevant balancing has already been authoritatively performed. The
function of an opinion in this context is simply to establish, as a factual
matter, that the defendant’s conduct cleared or failed to clear a preset bar.
There is less of a role for prudential arguments, which is why the speeding
ticket colloquy discussed in Part III.B.2 should not ordinarily find its way
into an opinion. But as the court’s orientation becomes increasingly
prospective, we may understand pathetic assessment of a litigant as a
broader commentary on those similarly situated.405 In proposing law
reform, it is quite appropriate for a judge to apprise the audience of the
stakes of the chosen course and potential alternatives.406 Doing so is likely
to be more effective if pathetic argument is, in some form, on the table.
This might be particularly so when the legal doctrines at issue rely on
some conception of expressive harm rather than measurable injury.407
402. Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy,
Justice Scalia, 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 425, 435 (2003).
403. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (explaining meaning of phrase
“cruel and unusual punishment” is not static).
404. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (explaining “due process of law”
requires “judgment . . . mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society”).
405. For this reason, pathetic argument may be more appropriate in cases where
equitable relief is sought. This consideration likely provides limited independent
explanatory power at the Supreme Court, where virtually all of the Court’s work is, in a
sense, prospective.
406. See Failinger, supra note 402, at 436 (claiming appellate courts have
responsibility to move audiences toward legal or social reform).
407. Pathetic argument may therefore have a special role to play in an area that sits
largely outside of constitutional law and nominally outside of criminal law: assessment of
punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded to express the community’s outrage at
tortious conduct. This expressive dimension may help explain the otherwise puzzling
constitutional doctrine under which a jury may increase the level of punitive damages based
on third-party harm only as a measure of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct
and not as “direct” punishment for that harm. Compare Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346, 356–57 (2007) (discussing disagreement between Justice Breyer and Justice
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Recall, in this regard, the discussion of excited utterances in Part III.A.
An excited utterance is perhaps more likely than a reflective statement to
be faithful to the actual perceptions of the accused, but it may be less likely
to reflect historical fact. The degree to which an emotional appeal is
appropriate may likewise depend in part on whether the court’s objective
is to tap into the reader’s subjective perceptions—which are crucial to
value ordering—or is instead concerned with persuading the reader that
some set of circumstances with a well-established social meaning did or
did not obtain. Emotional appeal is more likely to be appropriate in the
former than the latter style of opinion.
3. Promoting Deliberation. — This Article has sought to demonstrate
that emotion is an unwieldy category of human experience. The diversity
of emotional states and the diverse contributions that emotions make to
cognition and judgment are among the reasons why denying a place for
pathetic argument in constitutional law or constitutional judging is too
simplistic. The necessary corollary to that observation is that some
emotions are likely better suited to producing the kind of deliberation that
is valuable to constitutional law.408 We may believe, for example, that it is
preferable to conjure emotions that promote reflection about one’s deep
commitments as against those likely to distract us from those
commitments. We may likewise wish to support emotions that foster
other-regarding rather than purely self-regarding judgments and
perspectives.409
Aristotle spoke of “emotions of the soul,” such as pity and anger, that
he believed were “appeals to the juryman” rather than relating to fact, 410
but he did not develop an elaborate taxonomy. The Liber Pantegni, a
medieval text that remains the oldest known manual of Western medicine,
used similar terminology—“accidents of the soul”—to describe six
emotions associated with a physiological response, namely joy, distress,
fear, anger, anxiety, and shame.411
Part II.A described William James’s view that emotions generally are a
conventional label for precisely these kinds of physiological disturbances.
Stevens over punishment for third-party harm), with id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“This nuance eludes me.”). See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Punitive Damages After
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 44 Ct. Rev. 134, 141 (2008) (discussing disagreement between
Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens over punishment for third-party harm).
408. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 651 (advocating “emotional law and economics”
approach, which “would seek to isolate and control the decisional contexts in which
emotion . . . predictably leads to suboptimal outcomes”).
409. I do not mean to endorse either a deliberative or interest-based conception of
democracy. The elaboration of constitutional law through judicial opinions lacks the
reciprocity necessary to conform to leading models of appropriate democratic deliberation.
Articulating the relationship between the content of judicial opinions and well-functioning
democracy requires considerable work and is beyond this Article’s scope.
410. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 4.
411. Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 215 (2004)
(describing six emotions named in Liber Pantegni).
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James believed that these kinds of emotions—the “standard emotions”
such as “[s]urprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, [and] greed”412—
are not aspects of cognition and are not forms of judgment.413 He was
aware that other cognitive processes exist that bear a resemblance to our
intuitive understanding of emotion,414 but he insisted that their cognitive
structure denied them the status of emotion:
Yes! in every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of
certain relations being right or not, and there is the emotional
flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these are two things,
not one. In the former of them it is that experts and masters are
at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that
they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness
by Crétins and Philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its
lowest ebb.415
Modern cognitivists resist segregating these kinds of judgments from their
emotional responses and are more apt to describe emotions by reference
to their feelings and their intentional objects in combination. It is possible,
then, to use some of James’s examples of objects that inspire both
judgment and feeling as evidence of his views as to which emotions are
more “intelligent.” As Andrew Ortony and his coauthors write, “James had
essentially characterized a range of cognitive content for the emotionproducing perception from low (e.g., a mother’s delight at the sight of her
beautiful baby) to high (e.g., the delight of receiving a national honor).”416
Proceeding in this way, Ortony et al. continue, we can ascribe to James an
appreciation of the high cognitive content of emotions such as “‘shame,
desire, regret, etc.’” that are triggered by an appreciation of social
convention rather than merely instinct.417
Ortony et al. have usefully generalized their own views in a
monograph that aims to categorize emotional states according to their
cognitive content.418 Broadly, they classify emotions (or rather, emotion
types)419 according to “ingredients of appraisal”: Through emotions, we
measure events according to their relationship to our goals, we measure
the actions of agents according to standards of conduct or performance

412. James, supra note 130, at 189.
413. See id. at 202 (drawing distinction between “standard” emotions and forms of
cognition and judgment).
414. See id. at 201 (recognizing “genuinely cerebral forms of pleasure and
displeasure”).
415. Id. at 202–03.
416. Ortony et al., supra note 146, at 5.
417. Id. (quoting James, supra note 130, at 195).
418. Id. at 1 (“[O]ur approach will be concerned more or less exclusively with trying to
characterize the differences between emotions in terms of the different kinds of cognitions
we take to be responsible for them.”).
419. Id. at 15 (“An emotion type is a distinct kind of emotion that can be realized in a
variety of recognizably related forms.”).
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(for a nonhuman agent), and we measure objects according to attitudes.420
Within each of these categories we may react positively or negatively, and
we may assign responsibility for our reaction or assess consequences of
the event in light of our own projects or purposes or those of someone
else.421 That is, for any combination of personal identity, valence, and
ingredient of appraisal we can identify an emotion type, within which lies
a family of related emotions, the members of which can vary substantially
in intensity. Thus, a negative valence attached to the consequence of an
event that is desirable for someone else may be characterized as the
emotion type of “resentment.”422 If the event is undesirable for someone
else the emotion type is “pity.”423 If we shift the valence to positive, the
emotion types are respectively “happy-for” and “gloating.”424 Ortony et al.
proceed in this way to construct a general taxonomy of emotion.
This Part began with the suggestion that there is reason to approve
judicial appeals to emotions that foster deliberation about deep
commitments and that are other- rather than self-regarding. Using the
Ortony et al. framework, emotions whose ingredient of appraisal is an
“attitude” toward some object have a simplistic cognitive structure that is
less grounded in a deliberative judgment. Ortony et al. view the emotions
in this category, what he calls the “Attraction” emotions of love and hate,
as temporary states. As such, and accepting the Ortony et al. taxonomy, the
normative case in favor of direct appeals to these emotions is weak.
As to other- versus self-regard, we can refine the inquiry by limiting
the favored other-regarding emotions to what I will call “positive” otherregarding emotions. These are emotions that correspond to positively
valenced event outcomes regarded as desirable by the affected others and
negatively valenced event outcomes as undesirable by the affected others.
On the Ortony et al. taxonomy, more approved emotion types would
therefore include “happy-for,” “pity,” and “admiration,” and less approved
types would include “resentment” and “gloating.” These latter emotions
are other-regarding but not in a way that builds community by associating
others’ ends with one’s own. These emotions are not empathetic, and so
they double down on the radical subjectivity of emotion that makes
pathetic argument perilous.
Specifying the emotions that meet all of these criteria is beyond our
scope; it is a research agenda all its own. Note as well that the argument
just described makes normative assumptions about the desirability of

420. Id. at 13 (“We argue that there are three broad classes of emotions that result
from focusing on one of three salient aspects of the world—events and their consequences,
agents and their actions, or objects, pure and simple.”).
421. Id. at 16, 19 (describing structure of theory of emotions and providing graphic
depiction).
422. Id. at 19.
423. Id.
424. Id.
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other-regarding behavior that are contestable. Hannah Arendt has
described the failed political program of the Jacobins as instilling a “virtue”
that consisted in “identify[ing] one’s own will with the will of the people,”
and in elevating “compassion to the rank of the supreme political passion
and of the highest political virtue.”425 An ironic myopia may accompany
excessive concern for the social as against the personal; we may fail to
internalize the degree to which others hold different preferences and
harbor different aspirations. Resentment may breed ingenuity, which is a
different kind of virtue. The key point for now is not to settle on a catalog
of favored emotions. It is, rather, that concluding that emotions may vary
in their degree of subjectivity begins rather than ends the conversation
about when pathetic argument is appropriate.
4. Addressing Constitutional Subjects. — Finally, use of an emotional
appeal may be more appropriate when, as in the examples from Part II.B,
the appeal seeks to persuade the reader of the substance or valence of an
established constitutional subject rather than seeking more directly to
persuade the reader of a particular adjudicative outcome. George Kennedy
refers to the case of the great Roman orator Marcus Antonius, who in the
extortion trial of a war veteran, is said to have “ripped the toga from the
scarred body of the old soldier to exhibit his wounds” to the jury.426
Antonius was not well versed in law but, according to Cicero, “[H]e never
felt the need for it.”427 In the usual course, this will not do for
constitutional argument. The concerns over the rule of law that counsel
(too bluntly, I have argued) against pathetic argument are most deeply
engaged when the argument skips over the usual constitutional forms and
aims straight for the jugular.
IV. THE PAYOFF OF PATHOS
This Article has situated pathetic argument within constitutional
practice and has sought to justify its place in light of the nature of
constitutional law and modern philosophical, psychological, and biological
insights into the structure and function of emotion in our intellectual life.
The benefit of clearer understanding in this area is not just epistemic,
though that would be enough. This Article’s descriptive and normative
claims enable us to rethink a number of distinct debates within
constitutional law and practice. This Part highlights three such debates:
the dispute over the degree to which constitutional law is a unique
discourse; the role that marginalized conceptions of the good should play
in constitutional decisionmaking; and the place of sympathy in
constitutional judging.

425. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 75 (1965).
426. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric 112–13 (1994).
427. Id. at 113.
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A. A Specialized Practical Discourse
A trenchant disagreement separates attitudinalists and pragmatists
on one hand and doctrinal constitutional lawyers on the other as to
whether constitutional law is a specialized discourse or is instead
continuous with other practical forms.428 Although disputed on the
margins, mainstream legal and constitutional scholars tend to agree that
reasoning outside of Bobbitt’s modalities or its equivalent is not
recognizable as constitutional law and therefore provides at least a modest
constraint on the set of available outcomes in many (though not all)
cases.429 The classic attitudinalist position views the modalities as an
elaborate dress for the policy preferences of the judge, which legal
reasoning does not meaningfully constrain.430 Posner, representing the
pragmatist view, concedes that lawyers are specially trained and use a
particular vernacular but maintains that “there is no intrinsic or
fundamental difference between how a judge approaches a legal problem
and how a businessman approaches a problem of production or
marketing.”431
This Article’s descriptive claims suggest that, at least in the
constitutional domain, legal discourse is both specialized and continuous
with other forms of practical discourse. Constitutional practice focuses on
particular subjects of argument—text, history, structure, doctrine, and
institutional consequences—but it does not employ distinct modes of
persuasion as to the substance or valence of those subjects. The ubiquity of
resort to those subjects and the substantial number of cases on which legal
scholars agree as to the outcome quite apart from policy preference
suggest that the internal norms of constitutional argument exert an
influence over outcomes.432 But those subjects and norms do not preclude

428. See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1989, 1994–95 (1996) (noting debate “has dominated political-science scholarship about
judicial decisionmaking”).
429. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 903, 905 (2005) (describing divergent positions of political scientists and legal
scholars on constraining force of precedent). See generally Richard S. Markovits, Matters of
Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation 1 (1998) (advancing
account of “morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture”).
430. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model Revisited 2–3 (2002) (“Although the justices conventionally claim for
public consumption that they do not make public policy, that they merely interpret law, the
truth conforms to Chief Justice (then Governor) Charles Evan Hughes’ declaration, ‘We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.’”).
431. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 73 (2003).
432. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1003–04
(2009) (asserting existence of direct normative constraints on judges and Justices and
noting substantial percentage of unanimous Supreme Court opinions); Jack Knight & Lee
Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1018, 1019 (1996) (arguing precedent
constrains constitutional decisionmaking).
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a role for pathetic argument as a mode of rhetoric; indeed they may
require it for their sustenance.
B. Pathos and Nomos
Pathos is both gendered and raced. The rejection of pathetic argument
is justified by a resistance to the influence of subjectivity on public reason.
This view reserves the coercive force of the law for pursuit of a common
good from which radical, lived dissent have been excised.433 As Iris Marion
Young writes, “Many contemporary theorists of participatory democracy
retain the ideal of a civic public in which citizens leave behind their
particularity and differences.”434 Assuming universal reason necessarily
brands as outsiders those whose experiences and perspectives, aided by
the intensity of emotion, generate different cognitive judgments.435
Assimilating that process to the rule of law turns marginalization into
subjugation.436
Viewed in this light, Eastman’s defense of “Poor Joshua!” as a beacon
for his misunderstood and dispossessed clients becomes more pointed.437
Particularly when used in dissents or concurrences, pathetic argument is a
vehicle for incorporating marginalized nomoi into the constitutional

433. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 97 (1990) (“[T]he
ideal of impartiality . . . . masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant
groups claim universality . . . .”).
434. Id.; cf. Maroney, supra note 4, at 635 (noting derision of emotional judging as
successor to “Cadi justice,” form of non-Western judicial systems). But see Kathryn Abrams,
Legal Feminism and the Emotions: Three Moments in an Evolving Relationship, 28 Harv. J.L.
& Gender 325, 326 (2005) (“Work using emotion as an analytic tool may be premised on a
foregrounding or prioritization of individual subjectivity, and an insistence on selftransparency, as well as on static, unitary understandings of women’s circumstances,
identities, and ways of knowing.”). It is hard not to notice that the recent dust-up over the
role of empathy in judging revolved around the nomination of a Latina to the Supreme
Court. Both Latinos and women are typically stereotyped as overly emotional and therefore
less reasonable. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 Brook. L. Rev.
95, 95 (2008) (reporting results of lawyer survey focused on juror selection). Justice Alito’s
discussion of empathy at his confirmation hearing did not receive similar attention. See
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 475 (2006) (statement of J. Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (“[W]hen a case comes before me
involving, let’s say, someone who is an immigrant, . . . I can’t help but think of my own
ancestors . . . . [W]hen I look at those cases, I have to say to myself, and I do . . . , this could be
your grandfather. This could be your grandmother.”).
435. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2231, 2252–56 (1992) (discussing perniciousness of universal
view of objectivity and providing example of one woman’s experience of its effects).
436. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)
(“Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already
occurred or which is about to occur.”).
437. See supra text accompanying note 122; see also Maroney, supra note 4, at 634
(examining Enlightenment view associating emotion with “common people”).
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conversation.438 It is telling that, in criticizing Justice Blackmun, Rosen
compared him to Frank Murphy, “the warmhearted New Dealer who wrote
emotional dissents on behalf of the poor and powerless, but whose
tendency to let his heart get the better of his head deprived him of lasting
influence.”439 Murphy’s thin legacy is surely affected more by the fact that
he sat for just nine years, dying of a heart condition at the age of fifty-nine.
But in that brief time he penned one of the most memorable lines of his era
on the Court, writing that the government’s ancestry-based exclusion of
free Japanese persons from the West Coast “falls into the ugly abyss of
racism.”440 A pathetic phrase is worth a volume of logic.
That said, this Article’s conclusions do not necessarily support
progressive outcomes. Appeals to emotion obviously have the capacity to
and will sometimes support populist fears of the other. Moreover, the
subjects of constitutional argument that invite appeals to emotion are not
randomly distributed; they seem disproportionately, for example, to
involve the rights of women and children.441 Discouraging the use of
pathetic argument wholesale could mitigate the instinct to treat relevantly
similar cases differently. Emotional appeal seems a sufficiently textured
rhetorical category that this kind of prophylaxis is unlikely to be effective,
but readers will differ in the weights they assign the risks on either side.
C. In Defense of Sympathy
Part I.C discusses a common defense to criticism of President Obama’s
“empathy” standard, namely that critics misunderstand the distinction
between empathy and sympathy.442 Empathy, some noted, is a perceptive
capacity, not an emotion.443 But this Article has suggested that there may
well be contexts in which, whether or not it is appropriate for the judge to
display or experience sympathy, it may be appropriate for her to seek to
persuade the reader to be sympathetic. Indeed, Part III.C.3 offered “pity” as
just the kind of community-building emotion that judges should solicit
more than others.
Viewed in the most generous light, “Poor Joshua!” exemplifies this
kind of rhetoric. It invites the reader to assess the consequences of the
ruling not just for this Joshua but for Joshuas everywhere; individualizing
438. See generally Cover, Foreword, supra note 27, at 25–40 (exploring how insular
communities define and give meaning to constitutional principles through distinctive
normative views).
439. Rosen, supra note 113, at 13–14.
440. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
441. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (noting controversial
thermal imaging technology at issue could reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath”); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Poor Joshua!”).
442. See supra Part I.C.
443. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing perspectives of empathy as
perceptive capacity).
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the litigant in this appellate context is not necessarily an invitation to
“bias” (as in the Antonius example) as much as an invitation to the reader
to contemplate the societal effects of a rule that imposes little to no duties
of protection on the state. The reader who accesses his emotions when
performing that assessment may better appreciate how his values relate to
those consequences.444 Constitutional opinions that deliberately name
homicide victims invite the same kind of sympathetic assessment.445
These examples suggest that the claim that pathos is inappropriate in any
given case is often an argument internal to constitutional law about which
values among equally legitimate options should be prioritized. A judge
undertakes this kind of volatile argument at his peril, but with due respect
to Federalist No. 78,446 constitutional judging is a perilous business.
CONCLUSION
Our ambivalence about pathetic argument reflects an ambivalence
about constitutional law itself. Law that claims authority over processes of
democratic decisionmaking is evidently nonconstitutive in ways that are
important to liberalism. At a glance, pathetic appeals by judges seem to
exacerbate this tension by proposing that law be constructed from
materials that divide rather than bind us. On reflection it should be clear,
however, that excluding pathetic argument from legal persuasion is
neither desirable nor possible. Doing so both emasculates constitutional
argument and unreflectively takes sides in a trenchant debate over the
nature of constitutional law. Any effort to eliminate pathos from our
constitutional discourse would systematically bias our evaluation of
constitutional arguments in favor of the most subtle or least recognized
emotional appeals.
Articulating and approving a role for pathetic argument in
constitutional law supplies a needed amendment to extant descriptions of
constitutional practice. It makes clear that pathetic arguments are
continuous with quotidian modes of persuasion outside of constitutional
discourse while preserving the distinctiveness of constitutional law as
attending to particular, limited domains of argument. Separating modes of
persuasion from subjects of argument gives us resources for
understanding judge-made constitutional law as a practice both of
444. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1101, 1135 (1990) (“The judge who occupies a compassionate stance . . . can provide
a more thorough interpretation of the law and the facts.”).
445. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (naming
victim); see also Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (reproducing photos
appended to Cooper v. Brown, No. 04-CV656-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46232, at *287 (S.D.
Cal. May 27, 2005) (appending photographs of murder victims to end of capital habeas
opinion with no obvious analytic purpose)).
446. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 249, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution . . . .”).
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explication and of convincing, and one whose audience extends from the
judge’s colleagues on the bench all the way out, at times, to the area man.
Unlike speed limits, constitutional law must govern not only ourselves but
our posterity,447 and as Bickel wrote at his most perspicacious, “[T]he
future will not be ruled; it can only possibly be persuaded.”448

447. See U.S. Const. pmbl.
448. Bickel, supra note 106, at 98.

